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Preface 
 
An all-day symposium was held at the Suntory and Toyota International 
Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines on 10 July 2001 in order to 
commemorate the 50th anniversary of the San Francisco Conference of 
September 1951. It attempted to reassess that conference and the peace 
treaty with Japan which emerged from it both from international and national 
perspectives. This attracted a distinguished panel of speakers and a large 
distinguished audience. The symposium was held in conjunction with the 
Japan Society, London. 
 
The eight papers are being issued in two parts. Part I consisting of papers 
dealing with the United States, Japan and Britain has already been issued. 
 
In Part II we deal with related issues. Professor Buckley deals with Anglo-
American differences over the China question, the outcome of which was that 
neither the People’s Republic nor the government of Taiwan were invited to 
attend the conference. Professor Ferretti deals with the thinking of Prime 
Minister Yoshida at and after the conference, with particular reference to his 
desire for good relations with Britain. 
 
Alongside the Peace Treaty and the American - Japanese Security Pact there 
was signed the Australia - New Zealand - United States (ANZUS) Pact. 
Professor Meaney and Professor Trotter discuss the ANZUS Pact from the 
standpoint of their respective countries, Australia and New Zealand. 
 
We are grateful for financial support for this symposium received from the 
Japan Foundation Endowment Committee. 
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Abstracts 
 
 
Buckley describes how Britain took the independent step of recognizing the 
People’s Republic of China, a step which led to problems about China being 
invited to the San Francisco conference.  After China’s entry into the war in 
Korea, Hong Kong’s trade was squeezed through trade embargos imposed by 
the United States and its exposed security system was vulnerable, had it not 
been for the presence of the US 7th fleet in the Taiwan Straits. 
 
Ferretti shows that the leading ideas of Yoshida Shigeru on relations between 
Japan and the People’s Republic of China did not change after the failure of 
the Dulles-Morrison Agreement as he continued to pursue normalization with 
the PRC. He had the idea of joining the Colombo Plan and entering the 
markets of Southeast Asia by establishing a preferential bilateral axis with 
Britain but this was ultimately rejected by Britain at the time of Yoshida’s visit 
to Europe in 1954. 
 
Meaney describes External Affairs Minister Percy Spender’s views on the 
need for a Pacific Pact. When it became clear from discussions with Dulles 
early in 1951 that the treaty with Japan would not be punitive or restrict her 
rearming, Australia called for some sort of security agreement with the United 
States. This came to fruition as the ANZUS Pact which was signed and ratified 
more or less simultaneously with the San Francisco treaty. 
 
Trotter discusses New Zealand’s reaction to the Australian initiative over the 
need for a security pact. While she had considerable reservations, most 
notably over relations with Britain, she appreciated the need for security 
guarantees and joined the ANZUS Pact. 
 
Keywords: San Francisco Peace Treaty; People’s Republic of China; Korean 
War; Hong Kong; US 7th Fleet; Taiwan Straits; Colombo Plan; American-
Japanese Security Pact; ANZUS Pact; Yoshida Shigeru; Percy Spender; John 
Foster Dulles; Herbert Morrison; Southeast Asia; Japan; Britain; Australia; 
New Zealand; United States. 
 HONG KONG and SAN FRANCISCO: ANGLO-AMERICAN DEBATE on  
EAST ASIA and the JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENTS 
 
 Roger Buckley 
 
Writing to Winston Churchill in March 1955, President Eisenhower noted ‘an 
apparent difference between our two governments that puzzles us sorely and 
constantly. Although we seem always to see eye to eye with you when we 
contemplate any European problem our respective attitudes towards similar 
problems in the Orient are frequently so dissimilar as to be almost antagonistic’.1 
 
At no time was this unfortunate legacy more apparent than during the period 
between 1949 and 1952, when events in northeast Asia centred on three highly 
complex and closely interrelated issues. These were, of course, the appropriate 
strategy for conducting war in Korea, a raft of issues relating to the emergence of the 
People’s Republic of China and policies towards post-occupation Japan. It was 
virtually impossible for officials in London or Washington to attempt to draw up 
papers on the region without having to reckon with this troika of issues and, in 
addition, anticipate both immediate differences on Asian policy and take careful note 
of the major domestic political consequences implicit in every move, particularly in 
the case of the United States and its approaches to east Asia after 1949. To give 
merely three random examples taken from the Truman papers of the dangers lurking 
in the background: the president received a huge correspondence that included a 
message from Mary Pickford on the anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, 
strong endorsements from Governor Jim Folsom of Alabama, who wrote 
entertainingly after the publication of the 1949 White paper on China that ‘for the first 
time to my knowledge the State Department is able to see further West than the 
Hudson River’, while the administration took good care to cultivate Congressman 
Mike Mansfield of Montana over all things Japanese.2 Each and every shade of 
opinion on how the authors thought the United States should deal with rival  Chinese 
governments, win the war in Korea and control Japan emerge to almost swamp the 
White House.3  In the particular case of what might be the appropriate course of 
action towards the Chinese civil war in the years after Japan’s surrender, the range 
of opinion covers the entire political spectrum from sending volunteers to fight 
alongside Chiang Kai-shek, to dividing China into two separate states and on to 
recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the lawful government of the land.4  
 
 On what might be termed ‘the Big Three’ questions for Asia, it is probable that 
President Truman was correct to minute wryly that Allied progress over the 
Japanese treaty appeared to be one issue where Anglo-American differences were 
not insurmountable. In contrast to the British position over the PRC and London’s 
attempts to restrain MacArthur and limit the war in Korea, Anglo-American 
differences over the Japanese peace settlements were more muted. It is also likely 
that in terms of pressing international import, the construction of what some have 
termed the San Francisco ‘system’, ranked third on the immediate  American political 
agenda behind the horrors of Korea (recently referred to as not so much the 
forgotten war but physically as the coldest war) and the controversies surrounding 
China. In retrospect, however, the long-term consequences of San Francisco would 
have an even greater impact on American foreign policy in the Pacific over the next 
half century than either the China question or the Korean War. The construction of 
the multiple settlements associated with the Japanese peace treaty were to prove 
the lynchpin of American political, military and economic involvement in the region 
from the early 1950s to the present and on, surely, for at least another generation. 
 
For the British Labour and Conservative governments of the time the eventual peace 
treaty with Japan was seen as a necessary, if highly belated, event. Both front 
benches exhibited a bipartisanship that contrasts with the ferocious political battles 
between the Truman administration and its Republican opponents. The British 
approach tended to be low key, at least in public. Correspondence from Ambassador 
Franks, admittedly when he was already long retired, indicates that he was far too 
busy tackling Korean crises to have had any particular recollection of earlier input 
over the Japanese settlements. 5  Indeed, the British official approach to San 
Francisco appears to have been to limit open debate wherever possible, in order not 
to inflame those elements in Britain who preferred a Carthaginian to a 
compassionate peace. Opponents among ex-servicemen, civilian internees and 
Lancastrians far outnumbered those few who were prepared to speak up in favour of 
a liberal set of arrangements that looked to the future rather than the immediate 
past.6 Portions at least of the British press, however, should be excluded from these 
criticisms.7  
 
Explanations for the relatively benign Anglo-American dealings that culminated in 
San Francisco are perhaps fourfold. Secretary Bevin had laid down broad, general 
lines of policy towards Japan that anticipated a generous peace settlement. It had 
 also been long recognized that Britain’s junior status in the occupation’s lengthy 
interregnum would limit any over-large contribution to the eventual peace 
arrangements, where it was inevitably the case that the United States would 
dominate. Third, events in China and on the Korean peninsula by the autumn of 
1950 had become far too pressing and, finally, no British government was likely to 
have the energy to add yet another dimension to the already lengthy list of Anglo-
American quarrels abounding in northeast Asia. In a sense San Francisco ‘slipped’ 
through the net. The peace process was largely a bureaucratic exercise where 
ministers did not intend to press the Truman administration too hard, given that the 
region was ablaze, British interests effected by Japan were less than vital and further 
controversy ought to be avoided in order to maintain the broader Anglo-American 
partnership. 
 
Antipathy to post-war Japan was a view that united virtually the whole of the Asia-
Pacific - indeed it is almost impossible to find any Asian government that had a good 
word to say for the San Francisco peace terms. The majority of the states that 
signed the peace treaty had only marginal interest in the region and were there 
largely at the insistence of Washington in order to swell the numbers. This ‘packing’ 
could hardly disguise the fact that the treaty was an American-engineered 
arrangement, though technically under joint Anglo-American sponsorship, where 
John Foster Dulles most ably gained his way. Dulles worked like the successful 
lawyer that he had long been through lengthy, thorough debate and extensive 
correspondence where each and every statement was drafted to protect his and 
America’s position. The old and very tired refrain of ‘dull, duller, Dulles’ is certainly 
apparent though in his dealings with the Foreign Office. Dening could hardly disguise 
his impatience at one platitudinous lecture from Dulles on the future of the Asia-
Pacific, but for some one who had never previously exhibited much interest in the 
region, aside from describing Chiang Kai-shek as a Christian gentleman, his 
accomplishments are considerable. Dulles’ assessments of other governments were 
often accurate. In November 1950, for example, Dulles had written to General 
MacArthur, following private talks with Far Eastern Commission members that ‘we 
judge that their  [UK] principal concern is with the impact of Japanese commercial 
competition during the post-Treaty period’.8 
 
It may be worth recalling that the peace treaty with Japan was seen by Dulles as the 
most important of no less than five sets of negotiations that he was involved in 
 simultaneously. When he wrote to President Truman in early October 1951 to hand 
back his commission, he proudly stated that all his tasks were over. For Dulles these 
had been, as listed by him, first, the peace with Japan, second, a mutual assistance 
treaty with the Philippines, third, a security treaty between Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States, fourth, the US-Japan security treaty and, fifth, an exchange of 
notes between Secretary of State Acheson and Prime Minister Yoshida ‘pledging 
Japan to permit and facilitate the support, in and around Japan, of forces engaged in 
United States action in the Far East’.9 Dulles further informed Truman that the above 
mutual assistance and security treaties, in company with the retention by 
Washington of the Ryukyu and  Bonin islands, would provide for what Truman had 
ordered in his statement of 19 April 1951 as ‘natural initial steps’ to ‘strengthen the 
fabric of peace in the whole Pacific Island area, where security is strongly influenced 
by sea and air power’.10 
 
Debate over Hong Kong forms one important part of Anglo-American relations in the 
Asia-Pacific during the first post-war decade. It was an issue that stood somewhere 
between the ‘successes’ that the US achieved during the occupation of Japan and 
Britain gained after its return to liberated Malaya, and the ‘failures’ encountered by 
Britain and the United States when they attempted to resolve their many differences 
over China and Korea. It is hardly coincidental that the ‘successes’ for both nations 
occurred when each government could adopt a largely  unilateral approach, both in 
its dealings with its client and outside governments, while the ‘failures’ resulted from 
a constant, almost daily, set of bruising circumstances where each nation needed 
the other but found the solution of their respective differences almost at times 
impossible. Hong Kong, it will be suggested, falls into neither the Japan/Malaya nor 
the China/Korea category. 
 
Events in post-1945 Hong Kong serve as a reminder of the close linkage between 
China questions, the war in Korea and, though this can be overlooked, the full range 
of treaties associated with the Japanese peace settlements, as defined in Dulles’ 
letter to Truman of October 1951. Hong Kong both needed the support of the United 
States for regional security and trade firmly established through the San Francisco 
settlements and yet suffered greatly from American policies towards the People’s 
Republic of China during the Korean War and in the ensuing decades of the Cold 
War in Asia. The end result was that Hong Kong’s history was considerably more 
influenced by the actions of successive administrations in Washington than some 
 accounts of the territory’s rebirth and later achievements may have suggested.11  
Explanations for first the survival and then the growth of Hong Kong must confront 
not only the respective policies of the British and Hong Kong governments, but also 
the behaviour of the United States, China and Japan. Constant attention to domestic 
economics without some note of international relations will result in a lop-sided story 
for post-war Hong Kong, much as it does for those once heroic accounts of Japan’s 
rise to economic greatness. 
 
From the outset Hong Kong needed the United States. The reestablishment of the 
territory as a British possession would have been all but impossible if the Truman 
administration had objected strongly to the initial British moves in August 1945. The 
White House’s ruling that British personnel could accept the surrender of Imperial 
Japanese forces in Hong Kong, despite the vigorous objections of Chiang Kai-Shek, 
suggested that Truman was more sympathetic than his predecessor to the return of 
the European powers to the region. American cordiality continued as the territory 
began its reconstruction era. General MacArthur, for example, assisted in 
encouraging trade between Japan and Hong Kong and the colony helped itself 
through the activities of a small staff attached to the British mission in Tokyo. These 
commercial opportunities, however, were followed in the late 1940s by far more 
important and potentially damaging American policies towards the emergence of the 
People’s Republic of China. Hong Kong was once again a subject of cabinet 
discussion, Chiefs of Staff meetings, Anglo-American debate and substantial 
research by the National Security Council in Washington. The future of the territory 
was once again viewed as highly uncertain. Parallels began to be drawn between 
December 1941 and 1949. Anxieties focussed both on the possibility of direct 
military invasion by the PLA and the equally dire possibility of internal subversion 
and mass demonstration that could bring the colony to its knees without the 
necessity of Chinese troop deployments. 
 
The prospects facing Hong Kong, already being placed under considerable social 
pressure from the influx of Chinese refugees fleeing from the north, played some 
considerable part in the Attlee government’s decision to recognize the PRC. 
Although Secretary Bevin put a brave face on the difficulties that confronted Hong 
Kong in his reply to the United States that ‘the authorities in Hong Kong were now 
confident of their ability to face armed aggression, economic blockade or subversive 
activities from within’, the Truman administration was not persuaded.  Reports to the 
 National Security Council in July and October 1949 tell a very different story. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff warned in the summer that ‘it would be unwise for the United 
States to contribute forces for the defense of Hong Kong and Macao unless we are 
willing to risk major military involvement in China and possibly global war’.12 Detailed 
examination led the military to reckon with seven possible courses of action, varying 
from the wish ‘to combine with the British, if they so request, in contributing to the 
defenses of Hong Kong’ to the preferred option of maintaining ‘a passive wait-and-
see attitude’.13 Secretary of State Acheson reported to the NSC two months later that 
the American government had been careful throughout discussions with London to 
avoid even the slightest hint of US military support for the defence of the territory. 
Hong Kong might have the consolation of ‘moral support in the event of an 
unprovoked military attack on Hong Kong by the Chinese Communists and that in 
this circumstances the U.S. would support an appeal to the United Nations’ but this, 
of course, was of little practical value.14 
 
The British political position was further undermined by the State Department 
memorandum on ‘British views respecting Hong Kong’ that was distributed to the 
NSC on 27 September 1949. In an important statement that greatly weakens the 
frequently maintained assumption that the cabinet wished to recognize Beijing in 
order to safeguard its rule in Hong Kong, Bevin was reported as saying: 
 
‘The British Government would be willing to discuss the status of Hong Kong 
only with a united, stable, and friendly Chinese government.  It does not 
expect to discuss the matter with the Chinese Communist government, which 
may be presumed shortly to be established, as it does not consider that such 
government would be friendly to Great Britain even though it might 
subsequently be recognized by Great Britain. The legal position of the Hong 
Kong leased territory is unassailable until 1997, when the leases expire’.15 
 
Bevin’s reading to Acheson in September 1949 of his opinion that ‘we intend to 
remain in Hong Kong’, at least until ‘a friendly and stable Government of a unified 
China’ comes into being hardly accords with the assumption that the cabinet 
calculated that an early recognition of Beijing might offer immediate protection for the 
territory. Bevin’s almost Churchillian defiance was apparently merely met with the 
bland remark by Acheson that ‘this seemed sound and reasonable’.16 Yet, assuming 
that Bevin’s statement was something considerably more than simply the bravado 
implicit in Hemingway’s posthumous ‘True at First Light’ title, this would appear to 
limit any cabinet expectations of even medium-term reconciliation with Beijing. The 
 foreign secretary had argued both for the recognition of the PRC and still cautioned 
against anticipating any prospect of this providing much tangible relief for Hong Kong 
from such diplomacy. 
 
London would have been further concerned for the safety of Hong Kong if it had 
learned of the deliberations of the National Security Council in mid-October 1949. 
The body was  told starkly by the Secretary of Defense, on the advice of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, that Hong Kong would not receive US military assistance in the event 
of border incursions and that furthermore any recourse to the United Nations by 
London would be of little use, since, despite Article 42 of the Charter, ‘there being no 
United Nations security forces’.17 Nine months later and Washington would suddenly 
find itself interpreting international law with regard to the Korean peninsula in a 
decidedly different manner when the familiar ‘horses for courses’ rubric came into 
play. Washington’s senior planners had categorically ruled out support for the British, 
if called upon to contribute to any defense of Hong Kong; nor, incidentally, was the 
Commonwealth any more forthcoming when Australia, New Zealand and Canada 
were sounded out by British officials. The Canadian prime minister was reported to 
have responded in disbelief at the anachronistic thinking of the Attlee government 
over its attempts to persuade other friendly powers to rush to the possible defense of 
its territory. Given the experience of Canadian troops in the days prior to the 
surrender of Hong Kong in December 1941, it would have been political dynamite to 
even consider support for any such action by Ottawa. 
 
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson announced that, ‘While little surprise would be 
felt if the Chinese Communists did not take any military action against the British in 
Hong Kong, there are grave doubts that the Colony could withstand determined 
Communist attacks there over any considerable period of time, or even a Chinese 
Communist boycott or blockade which effectively denied entry of necessary 
subsistence’.18 It is particularly ironic that the nation that would shortly impose such a 
trade embargo against the territory should in fact be the United States.  In the difficult 
months that lay immediately ahead, it would be Washington rather than Beijing that 
almost brought Hong Kong to its knees through the imposition of the type of 
measures that in the autumn of 1949 it reckoned were the characteristic ploys of 
Communist states. 
 
 The British position over Hong Kong was decidedly weak once the People’s Republic 
of China came to power. Although  memoranda in London repeatedly stated that the 
new government in Beijing had more pressing issues of reconstruction and 
reformation to tackle than concern itself with the capitalist bunion on the south China 
coast, this was surely little but an oft-repeated article of faith by the British and Hong 
Kong authorities. Confirmation of British anxieties was seen by the decision of the 
cabinet to order the despatch of reinforcements to beef up the garrison to a level that 
was held to deter the PLA but not to boost strength to the extent that it might provoke 
a direct Chinese response. Such calibration was altered almost immediately 
afterwards, however, by the decision of the Attlee government to commit British 
forces to northeast Asia in the opening days of what would become the long and 
bloody war in Korea. 
 
Even prior to June 1950, Hong Kong faced innumerable difficulties to the extent that 
its post-liberation era might be defined as ‘defensive’ imperialism. The military 
garrison, as we have seen, was rarely up to strength, its economic reconstruction 
was far from assured, Governor Grantham had vetoed attempted reforms of its 
thoroughly 19th century political arrangement 19   and the advent of the People’s 
Republic of China on its vulnerable land and sea borders only added to this very 
obvious sense of uncertainty. While the expatriate-led administration could justifiably 
argue that the territory had demonstrated greater recuperative strengths than its 
many left-wing critics maintained, there was a limit to what these officials could do in 
the face of a new China and massive regional tensions. 
 
The twin keys to Hong Kong’s survival as a foreign enclave, where virtually the entire 
population was composed of disenfranchised Chinese, had to be security from 
outside forces and an opportunity to trade with the minimum of regional restrictions. 
From 1949 through the early 1950s, Hong Kong was a territory under siege. In the 
months immediately prior to the advent of the PRC, the colony’s Department of 
Supplies, Trade and Industry had had to admit that the ‘whole question of rice 
importation and distribution is extremely difficult in present uncertain 
circumstances’.20 Rationing was in force and fuel was hard to come by, though, as 
might have been anticipated from a long-established and experienced entrepot, 
there was a vigorous black market in scarce consumer goods and pharmaceuticals 
that enabled the wealthy and unscrupulous to avoid overmuch disruption to their 
daily livelihood. Yet once the Korean War had begun, Hong Kong found itself being 
 squeezed through trade embargoes demanded of it by a vocal United States and a 
rather more reluctant Britain. Washington insisted that all attempts be made by the 
Hong Kong authorities and their masters in Whitehall to cut off the importation of 
strategic goods intended for transhipment to China proper. The suspicion, however, 
quickly grew in the United States that the territory was less than efficient in operating 
measures that had been agreed to by both the American and British governments 
with the result that influential voices claimed that Hong Kong’s disloyalty was highly 
damaging to the United  Nations’ war effort in Korea. 
 
The problem had already been noted in general terms in perceptive CIA reportage 
on the review of the world situation in the days immediately following Mao’s 
accession to power in October 1949. When it came to analysing the position of 
China, the very first problem to be identified was the divergence of opinion within the 
‘nations of the North Atlantic Community’ over ‘the best course to follow in regard to 
recognizing the new regime’. The CIA noted that, although ‘ for the present the UK 
appears willing to follow the lead of the United States, extensive UK economic 
interests are pressing for de facto recognition and restricted trade’.21  Clearly all 
parties understood that any future diplomatic recognition was intended to promote 
trading relationships and that it was equally obvious by October 1949 that the US 
government would have to pay a considerable price for its presumed policies of 
ignoring Beijing and supporting Taipei. Opposition from Britain was merely the 
beginning of Washington’s difficulties, where it was felt that to enforce what was 
termed an American ‘ policy of non-friendship ‘ towards the new regime in China, in 
concert with smaller,  non-Communist states in the region, would necessarily require 
‘assurances of protection by larger powers, preferably by the US‘. 22   Such 
statements strongly suggest that the erection of what would become known as the 
off-shore security structure initialled at San Francisco was undoubtedly under active 
consideration two years earlier. 
 
In the few, short months between the birth of the PRC and the beginnings of conflict 
in Korea, it is apparent that the higher echelons of the United States government 
were taking steps to review what the National Security Council in April 1950 defined 
as ‘the present world crisis’. In an analysis that would be ordered declassified by 
Henry Kissinger in 1975, the background paper noted that the Russian and Chinese 
revolutions had been of ‘extreme scope and intensity’ and that with the recent 
decline of the British and French empires ‘power has increasingly gravitated’ to the 
 United States and the Soviet Union. 23  These developments were seen to have 
smashed the Euro-centric balance of power system, ‘over which no state was  able 
to achieve hegemony’, and replaced it with a bipolar world that risked ‘the ever-
present possibility of annihilation’. Washington planners feared the enhanced 
strength of the USSR and its new -found Chinese ally to the extent that it was 
concerned that ‘ no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength 
could be assembled’. The National Security Council’s authors warned that ‘the 
issues that face us are momentous’, and might involve the destruction ‘not only of 
this Republic but of civilization itself’.24  Terminology of this nature may perhaps have 
worked its spell on Samuel Huntington and his prose. 
 
Such apocalyptic writings prior to the outbreak of the Korean War are a reminder of 
the huge gulf in perceptions that divided the United States from its major ally on the 
politics of east Asia. While the NSC spoke of Moscow’s ‘new fanatic faith’ that ‘seeks 
to impose its absolute authority’ over the rest of mankind, the British government 
argued that open, equitable dealings with Beijing might prevent the establishment of 
a true Sino-Soviet alliance and have the potential to prepare the way for a future 
fracturing of relations between what the United States planners depicted as two twin 
anti-Christs. Clearly there was little that the authorities in London, to say nothing of 
their counterparts in Hong Kong, could do but attempt to shelter from the storms 
associated with a contest of this magnitude. Once individuals in the United States 
saw the advent of Mao Tse-tung and the war in Korea as part of a contest for global 
domination that had to result in a resounding American victory over the forces of 
darkness, it would be enormously difficult for outsiders to make substantial headway. 
 
Throughout the early 1950s there were major setbacks for London in much of its 
dealings with the region. Although the Attlee cabinet had disregarded the views of 
the United States and moved rapidly to recognize the People’s Republic of China, 
the anticipated dividends simply did not accrue. Beijing reckoned that Britain was still 
too close an ally of the US and complained that over issues such as the transfer of 
the KMT’s seat at the United Nations to the PRC it was not receiving the support that 
it felt entitled to expect. Equally, the expectation that there might also be assurances 
from the PRC over the fate of British personnel and their commercial interests was 
unforthcoming from the new Chinese government. The fact that the PRC may have 
had a legitimate grievance over the decision of the Hong Kong courts, under 
pressure from the United States, to hand over to Taipei the ownership of civil aircraft 
 impounded in the territory that were claimed by both Chinas only worsened Sino-
British contacts.25  The imposition of heavy taxation, special levies and the threat of 
expropriation of the sizeable British financial and trading concerns still attempting to 
do business26 were hardly the consequences that the cabinet had envisaged when it 
moved to recognize the PRC in January 1950. Evidence that Britain’s determination 
to maintain ‘a foot in the door’27 could work both to the advantage of London and 
Washington by countering the Sino-Soviet alliance is decidedly hard to find. Breaking 
ranks with Washington had not led to any easier dealings with Beijing. Sir Esler 
Dening, the ambassador-designate, for example, failed to be granted a visa by the 
PRC in the summer of 1950 and was obliged to cancel his proposed secret visit to 
China, which was intended to tackle the log jam of problems. For the next years the 
British bid to establish full Sino-British diplomatic relations remained ‘a policy 
unrealized’.28 
 
Worse was to follow for Hong Kong once the PRC intervened in the Korean war in 
the autumn of 1950. While it could be argued that the fact that the PLA was 
committed to a major offensive on the Korean peninsula reduced the immediate 
threat to the security of Hong Kong, the imposition of substantial trade restrictions 
simply replaced one difficulty with another. Official statistics tell part of the story. 
Hong Kong’s own Department of Commerce and Industry calculated that by the end 
of 1952 there had been an extraordinary reduction in trade when compared with the 
previous year. Imports were now down by 22.4% and exports by 34.6%29 For a small, 
vulnerable territory almost bereft of domestically grown or reared food and with only 
a rudimentary light manufacturing base, this was a threat to Hong Kong’s very 
existence. Since unfettered trade had been the rationale for the colony since its 
inception and the local government had traditionally avoided interference in such 
matters, the consequences were highly disturbing. 
 
The Truman administration fully understood the importance of gaining tight export 
controls on Hong Kong. The British government, while obviously wishing to assist its 
territory, was obliged to balance its support for Hong Kong against wider Anglo-
American priorities. Top secret (and still partly classified) National Security Council 
reports in November 1952 noted both ‘the British colony of Hong Kong and the 
Portuguese colony of Macao have been economically useful to Communist China as 
sources of Western goods. Although this usefulness to their present status does not 
appear sufficient to insure the safety of either colony, the Peiping regime has as yet 
 given no indication that it intends to seize them in the near future. Hong Kong’s trade 
and exposed position undoubtedly exert an inhibiting influence on UK policy toward 
Communist China’.30 The NSC acknowledged that Hong Kong’s trade had clearly 
declined since mid-1951, and, while attributing this fall, in part, ‘to the imposition of 
export controls’, sensed also that the Chinese authorities had ‘on their own initiative’ 
reduced purchases. 31  American disappointment at the prevalence of smuggling 
between Hong Kong, Macao and the mainland certainly contributed to the ‘hard-line’ 
approach adopted by US planners. Specific policies were approved over licensing 
toward Hong Kong and Macao in February 1952 that, seemingly without much 
consultation with the British side, since London is not even mentioned in the report to 
President Truman, intended to limit US exports. The NSC ordered that all but 
‘essential minimum short-term requirements for local consumption and for the 
continuation by Hong Kong of mutually beneficial transhipment or resale of United 
States commodities to non-Soviet bloc areas’ be forbidden.32  Categories of rated 
items were then drawn up in Washington, though US consular officials in the territory 
cautioned against automatically assuming that the Hong Kong authorities were in a 
position to enforce compliance. What is evident is that the American administration 
had no particular sympathy for Hong Kong and remained suspicious that the territory 
was a weak link in the US ring fence that was intended to severely restrict the 
acquisition of strategic goods by its Asian foe. 
 
Hong Kong’s predicament was more influenced by the British government’s 
recognition of the PRC and the fighting in Korea than by the specific details of the 
San Francisco peace treaty. Although some have claimed to see singular 
achievements, the underlying balance sheet records few British successes in east 
Asia during the period between 1949 and 1953. Secretary Bevin’s attempt to display 
an independent policy towards Beijing must be judged a failure in that it managed 
both to antagonize the United States, while unable to achieve its stated goal of 
establishing a more cordial environment for Sino-British relations. Any hopes of 
rapprochement with the new China effectively disappeared for the next  half decade 
once Chinese intervention in the Korean War had led to huge casualties and 
immense bitterness on both sides.33 Yet Truman’s decision to deploy the Seventh 
Fleet in the Taiwan straits in order to separate the PRC from Taiwan, contributed, 
paradoxically, to the external protection of Hong Kong, since the new commitments 
made by the United States with regard to the defense of Taiwan acted to deter 
 Chinese moves along its southern borders. The Chiefs of Staff, concerned about  the 
thinness of British cover in the middle east and Europe after the Korean War had 
begun, looked long and hard at Hong Kong’s position without being able to do much 
to support the view that the territory represented ‘a Berlin’ in east Asia that should 
not be permitted to fall.34 The military planners also equivocated over the fate of 
Taiwan in the case of an invasion of the island, preferring to stand aside and 
concerned at the impact that American military action might pose for Hong Kong 
itself.35 Truman’s orders to the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan straits were a 
godsend not just for the KMT leadership but also for the Chiefs of Staff.  The 
simultaneous imposition, however, of export controls on a Hong Kong long 
accustomed to the lax, Victorian world of laissez faire, was highly damaging to its 
trading position.  The territory suffered both materially and in terms of overall morale. 
 
Yet the signing of the Japanese peace settlements offered some consolation to the 
territory amidst the doom and gloom of trade embargoes and the fear, whether 
justified or not, of potential invasion from the north for the second time in a decade. 
Indeed, what mattered most for Hong Kong was, in essence, what was left out at 
San Francisco. Despite pleas from some quarters in Britain and the Commonwealth, 
the Japanese peace treaty very largely ignored pleas for trade restraints and 
commercial restrictions. Hong Kong benefited from the absence of what voices in the 
Board of Trade and the Ministry of Transport were pressing on the cabinet until the 
last minute. Herbert Morrison, to give him some credit, did pointedly ask the minister 
of transport in late June 1951 if his attempt to support the British shipping industry 
‘should be made a breaking point on the whole Treaty’.36  Esler Dening warned 
Clutton in Tokyo that ‘our main troubles with Japan after the treaty comes into force 
are going to be in the economic field. There can be no doubt that Japanese 
economic competition is going to present a very serious problem, and that the 
interests concerned here are very worried about it’.37 It was Clutton incidentally, who 
defined Yoshida as an old man leading a poor country, though this particular old man 
would live on to witness the most rapid development of any major economic state in 
human history. Yet the fact remains that these complaints from traditional 
manufacturing sectors were not permitted to determine the cabinet’s position that 
had been set out at extreme length in December 1950. The basic point made then 
was that the government’s aim ‘should be to secure a treaty which will permit the 
development of a peace-loving Japan with a viable economy’.38 The explanation for 
the rejection of controls on Japanese industries such as textiles, pottery and its 
shipbuilding capacity was, at heart, the need to be seen to be co-operating with the 
United States. For that reason the expectations voiced at the Canberra 
Commonwealth conference of 1947 on the limiting certain war-potential industries 
had to be abandoned. The Foreign Office’s background paper to the cabinet 
acknowledged that ‘in view of our own weakness’ it was necessary ‘to accept the 
United States Government’s judgement on Far Eastern security’.39 It followed, of 
course, that the Truman administration could largely get its way over economic 
clauses to the peace treaty. The cabinet was , therefore, told that ‘the United States 
Government did not favour the prohibition by the Peace Treaty of war industries in 
Japan since they had been largely destroyed’, and Washington was ‘unlikely to 
favour control of Japan’s war supporting industries (which were essential to her 
peace-time economy) or of Japanese emigration’.40 
 
Hong Kong thus gained through the failure of some quarters to temper Japanese 
reconstruction. The territory, in fact, along with all other British Asian possessions, 
had long needed close economic ties with Tokyo. While public opinion in Hong  Kong, 
Malaya and Borneo was in no mood to forgive or forget Japanese wartime behaviour 
and, unfortunately, there was to be no compensation or reparations payable for the 
Japanese occupation of the region, the colonial authorities had worked quietly and 
successfully to encourage trade and investment from Japan. 41  It was widely 
recognized in the Colonial Office that there was simply little alternative to the pursuit 
of such policies, since no other nation, certainly not Britain, could provide the range 
of consumer goods at the appropriate pricing that were required to get the Asian 
economies going again. 
 
If Hong Kong might be said to have been let off the hook by the United States’ ruling 
that Japan be granted a liberal peace, there remained considerable anxiety among 
its officials and business leaders over the international politics of the region. Here, as 
noted earlier, there was little or nothing that the territory could do beyond 
demonstrating its commercial, financial and industrial competence to each and every 
individual or government that wished to use Hong Kong’s services. The territory 
trusted that regardless of the Cold War in east Asia and the enforcement of trade 
embargoes, there might still be opportunities for Hong Kong to prove itself. Much of 
its manufacturing and financial expertise had after all arrived in the colony after 
decamping from Shanghai in 1949 and would quickly thrive anew in its hospitable 
enterprise culture. Yet the territory was obviously unable to influence American 
policies more than marginally, though it was shrewd enough to encourage the US 
Seventh Fleet to use its anchorage and to permit a large-range of US intelligence 
operations that ranged from consular staff on China watch to more clandestine 
activities associated with giving succour to KMT elements  intent on landing on the 
shores of southern China. 
 
The territory’s weaknesses mirrored those exhibited on a far larger scale by Britain 
itself. Over the troika of issues suggested at the outset, it is difficult not to see a 
general pattern of declining British influence during the years of near constant Anglo-
American tension from 1949 to 1953. The Fifties proved to be the final decade of 
British power in the Asia-Pacific and once Malaya had been granted its 
independence in 1957 there remained little more than the stewardship of Hong Kong 
in Britain’s keeping. The anger shown by many on the right in the United States at 
British meddling in the Korean War and the corresponding delight at the lack of 
response by Beijing to the recognition of the new China, the publication of the 
Yoshida letter to satisfy  senatorial opinion and failure to widen the ANZUS treaty 
remain, perhaps, the most noteworthy of British disappointments. The Japanese 
peace treaty granted to a somewhat unappreciative Japan its re-entry into 
international society along American lines, while the associated security pact and 
administrative agreements gave Washington precisely the basing agreements that it 
had aspired  to in the lengthy negotiations with Ambassador Dulles to ensure that the 
Pacific remained an American lake. Instead of the emergence of a newly sovereign 
Japan with, as London had hoped, its own policies towards the PRC and more open 
to British influences, San Francisco confirmed the basic directions of the occupation 
era. Yoshida liked to joke that SCAP’s GHQ stood for ‘go home quickly’ but, of 
course, the GIs have stayed on in sizeable numbers and Japan’s foreign policy has 
exhibited far less of the independence and initiative that Britain had anticipated in 
1951. The San Francisco settlements were made very largely in the USA and form 
the beginnings of a close US-Japan partnership that worked rapidly to elbow aside 
all other Western claimants. These American-designed peace and security 
arrangements have endured for half a century both to confound the critics and justify 
today’s celebrations. 
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YOSHIDA’S IDEAS ON CHINA AFTER THE DULLES-MORRISON 
AGREEMENT AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 
 
Valdo Ferretti 
 
From the time that Yoshida Shigeru was ambassador to London before the Pacific 
War his view of China was closely linked to his inclination to orientate Japanese 
foreign policy according to economic goals and to promote collaboration with the 
Anglo-Saxon powers. Yoshida had a China-first approach to international matters, 
which basically understood his tendency to act with Britain as far as Japanese 
financial and commercial penetration on the Asian continent was concerned1. Such 
outlook, concentrated as it was on the ‘prosperity of China’, seemed to be close to 
the moderate wing of the ruling class, represented by business spokesmen like Yuki 
Toyotaro and Ikeda Shigeaki1, but differed from the pro-western faction of the 
Foreign Ministry as the latter’s attention was mainly directed at Europe.This position 
may explain Yoshida’s welcome to the Munich conference of 19382, which led him to 
think that if British appeasement policy had led to a settlement with Germany, it could 
smooth frictions with Japan as well , or  his China centred reaction to the extension of 
the Anti-Comintern Pact to Italy in 1937, when he confessed to his father-in-law 
Makino Nobuaki his fear that Anglo-Chinese economic cooperation could now be 
directed  against Japan3. 
 
After the communist take-over in 1949 and China’s involvement in the Korean War, 
Yoshida had to face a difficult course when Japan was led by the United States to 
participate in the blockade of the PRC .Also the loss of the Chinese market could 
jeopardize one of his principal aims, the economic recovery of Japan, while the 
general perspective of the Prime Minister did not even take into consideration 
renouncing the western alliance.  
 
It is well known that after Yoshida became the Prime Minister of Japan in 1948, he 
tried to escape the dilemma , trying to play on the cleavage between British and 
American policies, on the eve of the so-called Dulles-Morrison agreement4. At the 
time of the peace conference London intended to protect its own interests in East 
Asia by appeasing China ( to which diplomatic recognition had been granted at the 
  
beginning of 1950) in the hope of restraining the Chinese leaders from Mao’s ‘lean to 
the one side’ policy towards the Soviet Union5. Once he was left free to recognize the 
Beijing Government, as Britain had done, and to sign the peace treaty with it, 
Yoshida sensed that Japanese trade with the continent might begin again. It goes 
without saying that such a design was doomed to failure because of American 
pressure, somehow inspired by Taiwan itself6. In any case, as a British Foreign Office 
minute read , 
 
‘it would[.......]be unrealistic to suppose that Japanese trade with China could be 
restored to the scale of the late ‘30s [.......].She now has to deal with a China 
which is not only independent of her, but also determined to get rid of its 
“colonial” economic status by a process of industrialization’7.  
 
Therefore the economic development of Japan had in any case to depend on other 
markets, which were actually focused on South and Southeast Asia, belonging to 
countries still subject to colonial rule or who had recently achieved independence 
often within the frame of the British Commonwealth.Opening the latter to the Rising 
Sun’s trade and investments had to be tinged with political colours and implied once 
more some kind of entente with Britain which still exerted an important role in that 
area8. Thus Tokyo relations with China and the United Kingdom became issues 
related to Japanese economic expansion toward South and Southeast Asia.As a 
Gaimusho paper later observed, Britain was trying to get closer to PRC by making 
use of trade, bringing about China’s insertion into international society and 
determining in the long run the latter’s admission to the United Nations.According to 
this document the Chinese threat to Japan would also fade in that way.As a 
consequence for Japan trying rapprochement to communist China9 was ultimately 
considered convenient. This scenario made topical the standing Yoshida had held 
vis-à-vis the Dulles-Morrison agreement in the years after 1951. 
 
Such a perspective was implicit in the ill-fated Marshall Plan for the Far East, 
proposed by Yoshida in the United States in November 1954 at the end of a long 
official journey to Canada and the principal European countries10, which was his last 
diplomatic initiative as Premier .It probably represented the most comprehensive 
project outlining a general programme for Japanese foreign policy after the Second 
  
World War, thus allowing us to see it as the culmination of other initiatives sketched 
after the return of Japan to full independence. 
 
The contents of the ‘Marshall Plan for the Far East’ are well known.It will suffice to 
remember here that its gist was to create a capital fund, provided by the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Japan in order to foster the economic development 
of South-east Asia and to check the spread of communism. The growth of South-east 
Asia was supposed to keep the region in the western political area and to ease the 
development of Japan. Yoshida thought of an authority designed to administer the 
plan, to head which he suggested the British High Commissioner to South East Asia, 
Sir Malcolm MacDonald . 
 
The choice of Macdonald has not merited much attention however among scholars, 
who have been satisfied in general with the statement made in the Yoshida memoirs 
that the Japanese Prime Minister had known him since the 1930s and highly 
esteemed or liked the Scottish diplomat11. Scarce or no interest has been shown in 
Macdonald’s views on Japan’s commerce with China, containment vis-à-vis the PRC, 
communism etc., which largely coincided with Yoshida’s notions. Even less attention 
has been paid to the fact that he was the first western politician to visit Japan after 
the San Francisco peace treaty and that it constituted an occasion for an exchange of 
views with Yoshida, in which the British ambassador to Tokyo, Sir Esler Dening, a 
protagonist of the Dulles-Morrison agreement, also took part. 
 
Since 194912, before the Korean War, MacDonald and Dening had shown to share 
the opinion ‘that there is no sign that the Chinese communists intend [........] to carry 
their aggression over into the bordering territories’, sharply distinguishing between 
the need to contain communism as such and the idea that danger coming from China 
represented only ‘continued infliltration, subversion and propaganda’. 
 
During MacDonald’s visit to Japan in July 1952 he echoed Dening’s views 13 that 
‘there was no future in Chiang Kai-shek’ and that the red regime in China looked well 
established, though it was ‘inimical to the free world’. 
 
  
MacDonald in his report to the Secretary of State had stressed the opportunity to 
‘keep in office’ Yoshida, whose influence, he wrote, ‘is strongly pro-British’. He 
claimed, ‘I doubt whether the condition of contentment which we desire in Japan can 
be maintained indefinitely unless there is a considerable measure of trade between 
Japan and China’. As to East Asia, he emphasized the opportunity to lead Japan to 
buy raw materials like iron or rubber from Malaya and from the sterling area. ‘Any 
extension of trade which increases the standards of living and purchasing power will 
be a stimulus to a further expansion in international trade’ he wrote, by stressing that 
the ‘Chinese market [.........] is denied to them by the policy of the western democratic 
powers; and this argument will become an increasingly powerful weapon in the hands 
of the Communist if we cannot provide adequate substitute for the Chinese market’. 
Sir Malcolm supported the demands also, that he had already heard from Foreign 
Minister Okazaki and from Japanese businessmen, that Tokyo join the Colombo 
Plan14. 
 
Two years later, on the eve of Yoshida’s voyage, all the subjects touched on in 
MacDonald’s report were still relevant, but the geopolitical framework had changed. 
The Korean war had ended and the Geneva conference on Indochina had marked 
the resurrection of China as a great power, who looked as if she accepted the rules 
of pacific coexistence and was able to play an independent diplomatic role. It is still 
difficult to focus on how Japanese diplomacy reacted to such a new change of 
scenario, but  Japanese observers probably realized that Beijing was becoming a 
factor of stability in Asia and that, if not the USA, Britain had  positively appreciated 
its role at the table of the conference15. 
 
It seems reasonable to conclude that in 1954 Yoshida could look at MacDonald as at 
a trustworthy champion of the terms on which he intended to revive a special 
relationship with the United Kingdom. At that time anti-Japanese feelings were strong 
at the peak of the British Government16, but MacDonald probably impressed Yoshida 
for his closeness of views to Dening. The Japanese Prime Minister may have seen 
MacDonald’s attitude as promising in the light of his project to bring to life again the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance, his nostalgia for which he did not conceal later in London 
with British ministers and officials17. 
  
 
Nevertheless in respect to the time of the Dulles-Morrison agreement, the project of 
‘Marshall Plan for the Far East’ presented at least one apparent diversity: the lack of 
properly political clauses like the diplomatic recognition of PRC or an explicit mention 
of the problem of China’s admission to the United Nations. It goes without saying that 
if such a scheme might be detected in Yoshida’s intentions, we could catch in his 
designs an attempt at mitigating the American attitude towards China by playing on 
similarities between Japanese and British schemes. Before showing that probably 
things stood like that, one may also note that in such a case one more reason could 
explain MacDonald’s candidature, as the latter in the 1950s seems to have been a 
partisan of the recognition of the Beijing18 government from the western countries 
and ultimately a severe critic of the containment policies represented by SEATO19. 
 
The contents of Yoshida’s conversations with the European politicians during his 
travels of 1954 however are revealing about his attitude on the Chinese question. 
Matsui Akira, a high ranking official who accompanied the Prime Minister, in a short 
memoir which appeared in 199120, showed  that the occasion when he opened his 
mind most was the interview he had in Rome, on October 18th, 1954 with the Italian 
premier Mario Scelba and the Foreign Minister, Gaetano Martino, though he touched 
on the matter more rapidly with other European leaders as well. Since then other 
sources on the same episode have been made available. The original documents on 
Yoshida’s trip have been released at the Gaimu Gaiko Shiryokan in Tokyo and I 
myself found in the Historical Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry a long 
handwritten minute, which from its rough draft, looks as if it were put down in writing 
during or immediately after the conversation itself21, perhaps by one of the two Italian 
officials (the General Director of Political Affairs Del Balzo and the ambassador to 
Tokyo D’Ajeta) who attended the meeting. It adds one interesting detail at least to the 
corresponding Japanese text, contained in a dispatch of twelve days later of the 
Japanese ambassador to Rome Harada Ken22 . 
 
Yoshida, whom the Italian politicians asked his opinion about the situation in the Far 
East and Chinese-Russian relations, claimed that the alliance between Russia and 
China intended to separate Japan from the United States. It was not solid however. 
‘The entente between Russia and China’, he said, ‘is far from complete [.........] as 
  
long as Russia and China will be together the cold war will continue’. ‘The Chinese’, 
he allegedly stressed, ’feel themselves to be the pivot of the world, thus being led to 
xenophobia’23. He stated that they did dislike unequal relationship with the Soviets 
and did not feel inferior to them. The Geneva conference had led Yoshida to doubt 
whether Russia supported China’s début among the great powers and he suggested 
that by playing on the commercial interests of Communist China the western powers 
could try to detach Beijing from Moscow24. 
 
Yoshida also commented on the policies of the Anglo-Saxon powers vis-à-vis the 
PRC. According to the Japanese sources, he stressed that British and American 
policies were different because the USA wanted to encircle China, while the gist of 
British strategy was recognition. All testimonies report however, on his perception of 
that diversity, marking his claim that he was going to discuss this problem in 
Washington and London. Yoshida added he considered the English position a 
mistake as ‘you can not collaborate with a communist government’. He remarked that 
Japanese recognition of the PRC was to be excluded also as long as Chinese 
propaganda was striving to influence and trouble Japanese public opinion. At the end 
of the conversation, Matsui reports that ‘an exchange of opinions took place about 
the recognition of communist China, promotion of foreign trade and communist 
China’s admission to the United Nations’25. 
 
The Italian premier observed that the contacts Yoshida looked for in London and 
Washington could be relevant to both Italy and Japan in connection with the issue of 
their own admission to the United Nations (a major one among the themes Yoshida 
wished to deal with in Rome, but where the standing of the Italians was opposite to 
his own). After Scelba asked to be informed about, and to get on with dialogue with, 
Japan in future, Yoshida replied promising to keep contact through the Italian 
embassy in Tokyo. Moreover the minute preserved in Rome adds at that point some 
lines absent in the Japanese texts. It reads : 
 
‘As to China he [Yoshida ] wants to correct [ his previous statements ].May be it 
would be opportune if China took part in the United Nations.The standing of 
Japan is not negative.What is most important is to divide China from Russia’. 
 
  
By these words it  looked as if the Japanese Prime Minister went even beyond the 
pro-PRC attitude shown at the time of the Dulles-Morrison agreement, albeit showing 
that he continued to prefer the British to the American standing. His ultimate purpose 
was to break the Chinese-Soviet alliance and to establish again trade with his 
continental partner, not to isolate the PRC from the international community. 
 
In October 1954 the Asahi Shinbun charged Yoshida with trying to build26 an 
economic entente with the western powers by joining the Colombo Plan and  flanking 
the defence structure of the Manila treaty (from which SEATO was derived). 
Moreover to hold such an opinion seems difficult to me today, as the South East Asia 
Treaty Organisation was pointing to China as an adversary, while for Yoshida it 
looked instead as if the true enemies were Russia and communism as a 
revolutionary movement, but not Beijing with which he intended to establish normal 
relations. He wished China and Russia would be separated and this was his principal 
problem. Probably not by chance, during the first stop of his 1954 trip he met  
MacDonald in Ottawa27 late in September and Yoshida himself told Antony Eden that 
their conversation had centred on how to separate the two communist giants from 
each other28. 
 
If Yoshida thought of a front with London in order to influence the American standing 
on the Chinese issue,his approach with the British was to end in failure however, 
even before Dulles rejected the ‘Plan’ the following month29. The atmosphere 
surrounding his visit to England mirrored the cool relations still existing between the 
two countries.On meeting the Secretary of State and other officials on October 27th, 
Yoshida stressed Japan’s need for trade with China, laying emphasis on the fact that 
it was his aim ‘to detach China from the Soviet Union’.  Eden conceded that the hard 
commercial war waged by the western countries had made stronger the Soviet-
Chinese alliance and that the bloc between the PRC and Russia would be weakened 
if trade with China were promoted. He firmly stated however that nothing could be 
done. He maintained that China had not aggressive intentions but explicitly asked 
Yoshida not to give the impression to the Americans that a common line existed 
between Britain and Japan. 
 
  
Obstacles existed in Britain at that time, as the Gaimusho realized, to any attempt to 
revive a preferential axis between Japan and England, which were rooted in 
commercial differences30. Specially there was the idea that Japan was the most 
dangerous  rival to British trade in Asia31 and to the British textile industry, as 
resistance to accept the Rising Sun in Gatt32 or to a lesser extent in the Colombo 
Plan33 was making clear. 
 
These were the main reasons which made it difficult to revive the old Anglo-Japanese 
alliance in terms suitable to the 1950s. Objectively speaking, views on China on both 
sides coincided almost completely and both diplomacies wanted to stabilize the Far 
East by normalizing relations with the PRC. They both assumed that Communist 
China would probably respect the principles on pacific coexistence announced by 
Zhou Enlai before the Geneva conference on Indochina of 1954 and would also 
appreciate opportunities of trade with the west if it did not feel threatened. The task of 
splitting the alliance between Beijing and Moscow also looked an attainable goal to 
experts in both countries, though Yoshida appeared to be more optimistic than the 
British in this respect. More general factors however intermingled and the Japanese 
Prime Minister’s dream waned for ever.  
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LOOK BACK IN FEAR: PERCY SPENDER, 
THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND THE ANZUS PACT 
 
Neville Meaney 
 
Reflecting on the Japanese Peace Treaty it is remarkable, after a half century, how 
so much of the peace settlement is still in place and how many of the issues from 
that time still resonate throughout the region. The self-defence article 9 of the post-
war constitution, under which Japan accepted restrictions on the use of its armed 
forces and thereby implicitly acknowledged its guilt, still remains intact. Japan 
continues to shelter under the umbrella of the American defence alliance which was 
brought into being at the same time as the peace treaty. Indeed the present 
American government, like John Foster Dulles when negotiating the terms of the 
treaty in January 1951, is pressing Japan to assume a larger share of the 
responsibility for protecting common interests in the region. Moreover its northeast 
Asian neighbours, most notably China and Korea, will not let Japan forget the war. 
They protest every effort of Japan to rewrite its history so as to explain away or play 
down the significance of its imperial past and wartime atrocities.  
 
Australia's relationship with Japan, by contrast, has in the same period undergone a 
dramatic transformation. Australia was profoundly affected by the war. It felt the war, 
and I use the affective verb advisedly, in a very different way from the Americans. 
For the Americans the conflict, though it began with the humiliation of Pearl Harbour, 
ended in triumph, the dropping of the atomic bomb being the symbol of total victory. 
For the Australians, on the other hand, Japan's southward thrust to Australia's 
frontiers represented a threat to national survival, an Asian invasion adventitiously 
averted. Marked as it was by Japanese brutality and cruelty the war seemed to be 
almost a realisation of Australia's long-held dread of the 'Yellow Peril'. Thus with the 
coming of the Cold War while America - and Britain also for the matter - could readily 
agree that Japan should no longer be looked upon as an enemy but rather induced 
by a soft peace to join  the West's camp, the Australians would have none of it. They 
stubbornly rejected the argument that the global struggle against communism 
justified appeasing Japan, encouraging it to rearm and treating it as a loyal ally. 
Even after the United States agreed to join in a mutual security alliance with them 
they only accepted the terms of the Japanese peace treaty with great reluctance. Yet 
today, fifty years on, Japan has become Australia's most intimate friend in Asia. The 
two countries are bound together by a wide range of common interests. In the 
parlance of diplomacy Australia and Japan are united in a 'regional partnership’. 
Very recently the Australian Foreign Minister has endorsed the American call for 
Japan to take a larger military role, including on Australia's very doorstep in East 
Timor. He was reported to have said that the Australian government 'wants Japan to 
be able to play its full part in the architecture of the region, including participating in 
peace-keeping operations’.1 
 
In this paper I will not attempt to explain how this great change in Australia's view of 
Japan has come about. Rather I aim to explore the history of Australians' perception 
of Japan, especially as that perception, influenced by the war experience, shaped 
Australia's attitude towards the peace settlement and informed its search for an 
American alliance. And for this purpose I will focus on Percy Spender, Minister for 
External Affairs in the Menzies Government, from December 1949 to April 1951 who 
was the Australian leader most centrally engaged in the diplomacy of the Japanese 
Peace Treaty and the Anzus alliance. 
 
First, a little background. Both the fear of Japan and its concomitant, the desire for 
an American security guarantee, have a long history in Australian foreign policy. 
 
From almost the beginning of the last century, specifically Japan's victory in the 
Russo-Japanese War, Australians had come to see in Japan  a threat to national 
survival. Alarmed that Britain in the event of a European War might not be able to 
send aid to the Pacific they turned to the United States. In 1908 when Alfred Deakin, 
as Prime Minister, invited America's Great White Fleet to visit Sydney and 
Melbourne he declared that Australians welcomed the fleet 'not because of our blood 
affection for the Americans but because of our distrust of the Yellow Race in the 
North Pacific and our recognition of the ‘entente cordiale’ spreading among all white 
men who realise the Yellow peril to the Caucasian civilization, creeds and politics’.2 
The following year in order to give these feelings a more concrete form he put 'A 
proposition of the highest international importance' to London, in which he suggested 
that Britain  might approach the United States to seek a Pacific alliance, an 
extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the Pacific. In the 1930s after Japan embarked 
on an imperialist course in the East Asia and the Fascist powers challenged the 
Versailles peace settlement in Europe Australia, fearing that with Britain engaged in 
a war in Europe it might be left to fend for itself, once more tried to draw the United 
States into a Pacific Pact. But both these efforts failed. America's isolationist walls 
were impregnable. 
  
With the onset of the Pacific War the Japanese rapid movement southward seemed 
to herald an imminent invasion. Their early military success, accompanied as it was 
by great cruelty in treatment of civil and military internees, left a deep impression on 
the Australian psyche. By the time of Japan's surrender the Australian government 
had reached the view that in the post-war world its chief objective must be to 
safeguard itself against a resurgence of Japan's military might. To this end Dr 
H.V.Evatt, the Minister for External Affairs in the Chifley Labor Government, pursued 
three connected policies. Firstly, since it had been shown that they could not rely on 
Britain, they wanted a security arrangement with the United States. Secondly, they 
insisted that in making the peace Japan had to be permanently disarmed. And thirdly 
they wanted a significant say in the post war settlements, especially that with Japan. 
Yet though the Australians from 1945-1949  pressed their cause they had no 
success. The United States rebuffed them on all sides and the British showed  little 
sympathy. In the meantime the highly volatile, almost manic, Evatt who unrelentingly 
pursued these policies became frustrated. He saw conspiracies everywhere and 
alienated the American and British leaders by his behaviour.3 
 
The Liberal country Party Government which came to power in December 1949 had 
substantially the same Pacific policy as its predecessor. While it emphasised more 
the  dangers of world communism, it too wanted a disarmed Japan, an American 
defence guarantee and a say in the West's global planning. Prime Minister Menzies, 
like Chifley before him, for the most part left the conduct of foreign policy in the 
hands of his Minister for External Affairs. In this case Percy Spender. Spender had 
much in common with Evatt. He had a strong, self-assured personality. He had 
distinguished himself at Fort Street High School and Sydney University, and had 
then made a name for himself at the bar. As a barrister he was a very well-prepared, 
assertive advocate who left no stone unturned in putting his case. And this style he 
carried over into his diplomacy. After an early encounter with Spender over Dutch 
New Guinea Patrick Gordon Walker, the British Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Affairs, commented , 'Scratch a Spender and you'll find an Evatt.'4 
 
Spender brought to office a mind peculiarly sensitive to Australia's position in the 
Asia Pacific region. Well before the outbreak of World War II he had become 
convinced that, as a result of the developing international situation, Britain would not 
in case of war be able to send a fleet to Singapore and therefore Australia had to 
look to defending the continent against a Japanese invasion and to obtaining the 
 support of America. He was elected to parliament in 1937 as an independent, 
defeating the Minister of Defence on these very issues.5 The Pacific War bore out all 
his worst fears. To his mind it was a salutary lesson for the country. And in March 
1950 in his first speech as External Affairs Minister he spelt out the meaning of that 
lesson. 'No nation could escape its geography', he said. Australia had to accept that 
its future lay in the Asia Pacific region and that this reality carried with it great 
dangers. In addition to being concerned about the emergence of Communist China 
and the instability of Southeast Asia Australia had to take precautions against 
'possible aggression' from a revitalised Japan. He therefore put forward the concept 
of a Pacific pact, centred on the United States. He hoped that such a pact would do 
for the Pacific what the North Atlantic Pact had done for Europe. He looked forward 
to a relationship with the United States in which there would be full consultation on 
all matters of mutual interest.6 
 
At the Colombo Commonwealth Conference in January 1950 and then again at the 
London meeting of the Commonwealth working party on the Japanese peace treaty 
in May, the Australians with the New Zealanders resisted the appeals of the British 
and insisted on a tough peace. At the latter meeting Australia's Resident Minister in 
Britain, Eric Harrison, repeating the Spender line, said 'It was necessary' that 
Japan's capacity for making and supporting war was not recreated and that Japan 
must be left no loophole for the resurgence of militarism. And he aired Australia's 
misgivings about America acting ever more unilaterally and, as a result, 'Japan 
sliding into a state of peace without the Commonwealth having a say in the matter’.7 
All these Commonwealth deliberations, regardless of their outcome, were, however, 
to no avail. America was the spectre at the feast. Without knowing America's mind 
they were working in the dark. 
 
The North Korean attack on South Korea which was launched on 25 June gave a 
new impetus to the American consideration of a Japanese Peace Treaty, and from 
the outbreak of the Korean conflict Spender had seen in the American decision to 
force back the Communists an opportunity to achieve his Pacific Pact. Thus in 
answer to an American request for military contributions to the United Nations 
forces, he wanted Australia 'to scrape the bucket to see what we can give’.8 
Menzies, however, remained unmoved. The Prime minister did not share Spender's 
enthusiasm for America or a Pacific Pact. He saw such sentiments as endangering 
Australia's ties to Britain and the British world. After attending a British Cabinet 
Meeting he cabled Spender that the British Government was reluctant to send a 
 military contingent to Korea. Hence he recommended that the government should do 
nothing until after Anglo-American talks which were shortly to examine the problem. 
 
Spender was not pleased. When then he learnt that the British, while Menzies was 
travelling by sea to America, had reversed themselves and were about to offer 
troops for the United Nations' forces in Korea he was determined that Australia 
should not be left in Britain's wake. It was crucial for his American purposes that 
Australia should make its offer first. Since Menzies could not be safely contacted 
Spender prevailed upon the acting Prime Minister, Arthur Fadden, to make the 
Australian commitment.9 Arriving in New York Menzies was quickly reconciled to 
what Spender and Fadden had done. After all Britain was also contributing and the 
Americans expressed their gratitude by giving him an even warmer welcome. 
 
Menzies in Britain and North America did his best to ingratiate himself with his 'great 
and powerful friends' and undermine Spender's approach to the peace treaty and the 
pact. At a dinner at the Australian Embassy in Washington, attended by Dean 
Acheson, the American Secretary of State, he said that he favoured a 'generous and 
not a punitive peace'. The Americans were pleasantly surprised to learn that the 
Australian Prime Minister shared their opinion that the Japanese peace treaty should 
not contain any economic or military restrictions, except possibly  restrictions on their 
right to build a navy with offensive capabilities.10 Moreover in Britain and Canada he 
showed no enthusiasm for an American alliance. Visiting Ottawa he told the 
Canadians that it was not Australian policy to promote a Pacific Pact. He considered 
it to be 'unrealistic'. He looked upon it as an attempt 'to erect a superstructure on a 
foundation of jelly’. In a condescending manner he dismissed the idea as 'Spender's 
baby', as though he had, against his better judgement, rather indulgently allowed his 
over zealous Minister for External Affairs to chase this will-of-the-wisp.11 Indeed just 
before Spender himself was about to set out on a trip to Britain and America 
Menzies  sent  a cable to Canberra warning Spender off. He asked the Acting Prime 
Minister, Arthur Fadden, to tell 
 
Percy Spender that the Pacific Pact is not at the present 
on the map because the Americans are uneasy about the 
stability of most Asiatic countries. We do not need pact 
with America. They are already overwhelmingly friendly to 
us.12 
 
Spender, however, was not to be deflected from his course. In America in early 
September he took his message to every forum open to him, to the press, the 
 congress, the Secretary of State and the President. But it was only after John Foster 
Dulles, the State Department official in charge of negotiating the Japanese Peace 
Treaty, presented him with America's proposed terms for a peace settlement that the 
Australian was taken seriously. On 22 September when Dulles revealed the 
American plans, Spender was aghast to learn that the Americans did not intend to 
place any restrictions on Japanese re-armament. There was nothing feigned about 
his strong reaction. An American official present on the occasion recorded in his 
memoirs, 'Sir Percy is a rather short, reddish-haired man with florid complexion. As 
he read the memorandum his face grew more and more suffused with color, and at 
one point I thought that he would burst a blood vessel’. Spender did not mince 
words, reminding Dulles of Australia's fears of a possible revival of the Japanese 
danger. 'Australia's immediate and direct concern', he said 'was security against 
future Japanese aggression’. Dulles was taken aback by the vehemence of the 
Australian response, and after Spender intimated that an American guarantee might 
go some way to persuading his country to accept a more lenient peace the American 
allowed that some 'compromise solution' would have to be found.13 
 
But Spender returned to Australia with nothing in his hand. After his departure from 
America Australia became merely an onlooker in the events that brought the 
Japanese peace treaty to the negotiating table and led to the drafting of the Anzus 
pact. It was international circumstances not Spender's diplomacy which broke 
through the impasse. 
 
China's entry into the Korean War at the end of November shocked America into 
action. Within a few weeks of the Chinese intervention the Americans had decided to 
proceed with the Japanese Peace Treaty and to promote in association with it an off-
shore island Pacific defence arrangement. On 10 January the President appointed 
Dulles as his Special Representative to lead a mission to Tokyo to treat with the 
Japanese about a peace settlement and also to look into the possibility of creating a 
'mutual assistance arrangement' among friendly Pacific island nations, 'Australia, 
New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, the United States , and perhaps Indonesia’. 
This latter scheme was to have the dual purpose of protecting the members of the 
alliance from Japan as well as their external enemies. In his instructions Truman 
made it clear that the United States would only be willing to enter into such an 
arrangement if the other member nations accepted 'the general basis on which the 
United States is prepared to conclude a peace settlement’.14 
 
 The Australians had no direct knowledge of what the Americans were about. 
Spender, however, was aware that new developments were afoot. The press reports 
of new American thinking about a Japanese Peace Treaty and of high level Anglo-
American exchanges over China's entry into the Korean War were enough to arouse 
his suspicions that Australia might be presented with a fait accompli. Thus in early 
January he cabled Menzies, who was attending a Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Conference in London, that he should tackle the British about it and not depart from 
the Australian position, namely that Japan was 'the only country which represents an 
actual threat to Australian security in the foreseeable future’.15 
 
There were some grounds for Spender’s distrust of Britain for the British failed to 
consult Australia about their response to the American plans. After Dulles had on 12 
January informed the British Ambassador in Washington of his mission, London 
recognised that the moment had arrived for settling the Japanese peace treaty and 
Pacific security arrangements. On 6 February Ambassador Gascoigne in Tokyo 
conveyed the British  conclusions to Dulles. While accepting that there should be no 
limits on Japanese re-armament except for submarines and a strategic airforce he 
raised many objections to the Pacific island nations defence arrangement. 
Gascoigne, given a few days to ponder further the matter, spoke again and in even 
more emphatic terms to Dulles about the American Pacific defence scheme, saying 
that his government ‘most definitely and implicitly would not be able to accept 
establishment of a Pacific Defence council which did not include the United 
Kingdom’.16 Britain’s objections weighed heavily with the Americans, and Dulles was 
puzzled on how to proceed when he left Tokyo to talk to the Filipino, Australian and 
New Zealand leaders.  
 
At last the Americans were coming to Australia. At last it seemed possible that they 
were ready to respond to Spender's appeals. If he could avoid it he had no intention 
of allowing this opportunity to slip from his grasp. Yet even as he prepared for the 
meeting with Dulles he came under pressure from the British to act with caution. The 
United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canberra, Edward J.Williams, and Sir  Esler 
Dening, whom the British Foreign Office had sent out specially to keep an eye on the 
Australian - New Zealand  - American talks, on the eve of the conference tried to 
influence Spender. The Commonwealth Relations Office had indicated to Williams 
that Britain 'would pretty certainly wish to be a party to any military arrangement if 
only so that we should be in a position to ensure that the major considerations for us 
(namely encouraging Australia and New Zealand to keep their eyes firmly on the 
 Middle East) was kept to the fore through out’. Thus the task before Williams and 
Dening was to persuade the Australians and New Zealanders not to commit 
themselves hastily but to 'give themselves and ourselves time to examine this 
important issue properly and work out fully considered proposals’. They put all the 
British objections to the island chain mutual defence scheme to Spender and pointed 
out that if it included Japan the Australians might be called upon to pay a high price 
since Japan was more likely to be attacked than they were. Spender was not 
swayed by these arguments. He was determined to obtain some form of security 
guarantee from the Americans. He would prefer a simple tripartite pact but would, if 
necessary, accept the inclusion of the Philippines. Failing this he might in the last 
resort, he said, 'have to be content with something else’.17  
 
After the long build-up to this great occasion the first day of the conference, 15 
February, was something of an anti-climax. Spender as chairman had opened the 
discussion by putting the Australian and New Zealand main objective on the table. 
Spender said that Australia was worried by the lack of any reference to Japanese 
rearmament in the proposed peace terms. He had no objection to allowing sufficient 
defence forces for Japan self-protection. But then he rehearsed all the old 
arguments about Japan’s untrustworthiness. It was ’doubtful whether the Japanese 
had undergone a real change of heart'. It was possible that if given an opportunity 
they might ‘recover as quickly as Germany had  done after World War I and make 
demands that the smaller Pacific nations might not be able to resist’. Moreover there 
was no reason to believe that in a ‘conflict between the Soviet Union and the 
democracies’ Japan would not seek to recover the territories it had lost in the war. 
The best solution would be a United States, Australia and New Zealand pact with a 
framework for consultation which would connect the pact to Nato.  
 
Dulles in response side-stepped the issue. It was as though he was uncertain about 
the whole Pacific defence question. He had nothing well thought out on Pacific 
security to bring to the meeting. The question of Japan and its allegiance to the West 
and the consequent need for a soft Japanese peace treaty had been the starting 
point for the defence plans and so it was here that Dulles began his introductory 
remarks. In justifying America’s non-punitive peace Dulles emphasised the 
importance of preventing Japan and its great industrial resources from falling into the 
hands of the Communists. Japan had to be wooed. It was essential that it should 
become a bulwark against the spread of Communism. It had to be convinced that its 
best interests lay in alliance with the Western powers. This led him to the vexed 
 question of Japanese re-armament. And he extended himself in trying to show that 
Australia and New Zealand had nothing to fear. Rather disingenuously he stated that 
he had not discussed possible re-armament with the Japanese when in Tokyo and 
that both economic difficulties and a pacifist public opinion made it unlikely that the 
Japanese would wish to hasten in this direction. The United States intended, with 
Japan’s consent, to keep forces in Japan until it was ready to contribute to its own 
defence. Indeed the ‘presence of American troops in Japan was an additional 
assurance that there would be no aggression by Japan against the countries in the 
South Pacific’. He nevertheless understood the problems which the Australian and 
New Zealand leaders had with public opinion and recognised that, if for no other 
reason, the peoples of the two nations should be given reassurance.  For Dulles the 
only possible explanation for the Australian and New Zealand leaders’ agitation 
about Japanese re-armament was the need to placate an ignorant and emotional 
public opinion. 
 
The next day, with Cabinet’s authority behind him, Spender told Dulles that Australia 
could not accept the proposed American terms for the peace treaty ‘unless 
its.disadvantages were offset by an acceptable security arrangement in the Pacific’. 
But what Spender seemed to be offering in return for this pact was merely to 
withdraw Australia's demand for total disarmament for he still maintained that, even 
with a security pact, some limitations should be placed upon the levels of Japanese 
armaments. Dulles merely repeated the arguments for a peace treaty free of any 
formal restrictions, whether military or economic. The best defence against Japan’s 
misuse of its restored sovereignty would be the integration of Japan into the 
collective defence of the region. But in attempting to achieve this Dulles had been 
frustrated. The United Kingdom’s strong objections to the Pacific offshore island 
proposal had made it difficult to proceed.  
 
Spender was indignant that Britain's interposition should have diverted the 
Americans from  pursuing the possibility of a pact. He ‘expressed surprise that the 
United States should put the objections of the United Kingdom before the Australian 
view that those objections could be overcome’. It should be remembered that 
‘Australia was a principal in the area but the United Kingdom was not’. Here he was 
in effect rehearsing the Menzies doctrine of April 1939 about Asia being for Australia 
not the Far East but the ‘Near North’, the same doctrine which had informed Evatt’s 
attitude towards the Pacific. As Spender expressed it elsewhere, in their region the 
Australians not the British were the ‘metropolitan power’. He maintained that an 
agreement simply between the United States, Australia and New Zealand, which 
would be free from the problems raised by the British, was the best option. In 
response Dulles, perhaps worn down by Spender’s terrier-like advocacy, allowed 
that the officials attached to the delegations might look at the substance of such a 
treaty, that is the nature of the obligations which each party might be asked to 
assume. 
 
The officials under Australian leadership drew up, however, not a report on 
obligations but a draft treaty which became the basis for the ultimate Anzus Pact. On 
the last day of the conference when the draft was presented to the delegates 
Spender spoke of the proposed pact in terms which would appeal to Dulles. The 
tripartite agreement was to be the nucleus of what hopefully would grow into ‘a wide 
and inclusive system of collective security in the Pacific’. At the heart of the 
agreement was Article IV which declared that ‘Each party recognises that an armed 
attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its peace and 
safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with 
its constitutional processes’. The language of the Monroe Doctrine was invoked to 
suggest that America was extending to Australia and New Zealand the same 
protection from external enemies that was conferred by the Doctrine on all states of 
the Western Hemisphere. In this sense it was a fulfilment of what Deakin had 
adumbrated in 1909. The treaty also provided for a Council of Foreign Ministers and 
authorised it to establish consultative relationships with other states, regional 
organisations or associations of states that could contribute to the security of the 
Pacific area. For Dulles the only remaining question was whether the Philippines 
should be invited to become a member. It would show that the agreement was not a 
‘White Man’s' pact. It would be an earnest of the American vision for building a 
broader collective security structure in the Pacific. Spender intent on having his pact 
almost, it might be said, at any price, nevertheless stated that Australia would not 
stand in the way of the Philippines. 
 
If the Pact went ahead Spender assured Dulles that he would recommend to the 
Australian Government that it accept America’s proposals for a Japanese peace 
treaty. Nevertheless he still could not quite free himself from Australia’s 
apprehensions about Japanese re-armament, and he suggested that Japan should 
be required after the signing of the peace to enter into a voluntary undertaking to 
limit its military development and that the Western powers should place controls over 
the export of strategic materials to Japan.18 These suggestions, and they were only 
 suggestions, fell on barren soil; the Americans gave them short shrift. Their very 
mention, however, shows that for Spender fear of Japan lingered. Even an American 
alliance was not by itself a sufficient safeguard against the prospect of a resurgent 
Japan. 
 
Following the conference Australia had no further role to play in the Japanese Peace 
Treaty. While the Anzus Pact, which was signed and ratified more or less 
simultaneously with the Japanese Peace Treaty, was approved by the Labor 
opposition and the public at large, the peace treaty did not have the same popular 
support. The government in pushing the latter through parliament were most 
uncomfortable in trying to justify its lack of restrictions on re-armament. The Labor 
Party voted against it and in a Morgan public opinion poll 67% of Australians also 
opposed it. Indeed it was not until 1954 that the Menzies government abandoned the 
idea that Japan was a threat to Australian security. 
 
In looking back on Australia's role in the making of the Japanese Peace Treaty and 
the Pacific Pact the most interesting question is not that which has dominated most 
treatments of the topic, namely whether the Anzus Alliance, assumed to be a good 
thing, was achieved as a result of Spender' wily diplomacy or conceded by the 
Americans out of necessity or magnanimity. Rather after fifty years it would seem 
more appropriate to ask how one can account for Australia's compulsive fear of 
Japan which led to Spender's unwavering, one might almost say obsessive, 
campaign to limit Japan's re-armament  and to obtain an American security alliance. 
 
In order to appreciate the significance of this question it is important to bear in mind 
that Spender ignored both the advice of his government's advisers who nowhere in 
their strategic surveys listed Japan as a danger to national security and the self 
evident geo-political reality that since America was committed to containing 
Communism in the region it incidentally provided Australia with the most foolproof 
protection that it had ever enjoyed. Carrying the point further it might be asked why 
Spender at the very time Australia least needed an American alliance so tenaciously 
pursued it, why he was willing to pay almost any price for the alliance, including 
eventual Japanese membership and why he wanted limits on Japanese rearmament 
as well as the alliance.  
 
The explanation must be found in the history of the issue and the way in which 
Australians' perceptions of Asia and Japan had evolved. That is, it must be seen 
 against the background of European Australians' racial fear of Asia as the 'Yellow 
Peril' and its security fear of Japan as the military standard bearer for the Asian 
menace. The Second World War in bringing the Japanese enemy to Australia's 
doorstep had made these fears so palpable, the meeting of Japan and Australia in 
Southeast Asia and New Guinea had been so fierce and brutal, that in the aftermath 
of the war Australian political leaders were unable to reassess Japan's position in 
the region against the new international circumstances. Thus they imagined their old 
trauma of national survival reproducing itself endlessly and so adopted policies 
aimed to meet this historically conditioned contingency.  
 
Spender felt the full force of this history more intensely than most. Admittedly he was 
anxious about the implications of the Communist revolution in China and the impact 
of Communism on national independence movements in Southeast Asia. But he 
genuinely believed that Japan was, as he put it to Menzies, 'the only country which 
represents an actual threat to Australian security in the foreseeable future’. In the 
late 1930s as the international situation had deteriorated he had been among the 
first to understand that Britain and its Singapore base could not be relied upon and, 
as a result, had turned to the United States as the only possible great power 
protector. Both his political and personal identities were peculiarly bound up in this 
cause. Thus he committed himself without reservation - even defying the British and 
at times his prime minister in the process - to achieve his twin goals of preventing 
Japan from again becoming a military threat and of engaging America in Australia's 
defence. What did Australia receive from the alliance which it would not have had 
without it? Certainly it did not obtain support for its most immediate security interest 
during the 1950s, namely preventing Indonesia from annexing Dutch New Guinea. 
At the end one must wonder whether Spender’s absolute commitment to achieving 
the American alliance was not a rather misguided endeavour.  
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SAN FRANCISCO TREATY-MAKING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS  
FOR NEW ZEALAND 
Ann Trotter 
 
There are those in New Zealand who feel that the events we are remembering today, at 
least insofar as they relate to the Australia New Zealand United States Security Treaty 
(ANZUS), are best forgotten. It is ironic that, while relations with Japan these days are 
good and certainly non-controversial, New Zealand is now a ‘friend’ rather than an ally 
of the United States and her relations with Australia are strained by the current 
minimisation of New Zealand’s defence capability. In 1951 Sir Carl Berendsen, New 
Zealand’s delegate to the San Francisco conference, spoke of New Zealand’s intention 
to play its part as a good neighbour in the Pacific  and called on Japan ‘to fulfill our 
trust’. He spoke of ANZUS as a reaffirmation ‘that these three countries have 
established a true and lasting comradeship and goodwill and common trust and 
confidence’.1 Times change. 
 
It was the debate over the nature of the Japanese peace treaty which drew New 
Zealand into new and more sophisticated relationships with the United States and with 
Australia. The generous peace treaty and the security treaties which accompanied it 
involved a new level of diplomatic activity and unaccustomed strategic thinking for New 
Zealand. This involved a challenge to New Zealand’s traditional relationship with the 
United Kingdom though the implications of the new situation were not recognised by the 
politicians at that time and a reassessment of this relationship was not seen as 
necessary in 1951. 
 
Security considerations 
The war in the Pacific, the lengthy negotiations to establish a peace treaty and the 
changing balance of forces as the Cold War closed in, forced New Zealand and 
Australia to think about their relationship in strategic terms. They had to recognise their 
geographically anomalous position. As one writer has put it, they are ‘two outliers of the 
west perched under the very diverse, dynamic but unstructured realm of Eastern Asia’.2 
By the Canberra Pact in 1944 New Zealand and Australia accepted a broad mutuality of 
  
 
interest in the Pacific and in 1951 the concept that New Zealand and Australia constitute 
a single or shared strategic entity was a given.  
But the geographical facts  do not mean that the strategic concerns of the two countries 
are identical. Twelve hundred miles separate New Zealand and Australia. In 1900 when 
the Australian federation was formed, these miles were seen as 1200 good reasons 
why New Zealand should not join. The distance argument, irrelevant now and probably 
irrelevant then has, however, served down the years to put a particular cast on the 
relationship between the two countries and to amplify New Zealand’s sense of its own 
isolation. In the debate about New Zealand defence policy these days  the claim that 
New Zealand is ‘surrounded by the largest moat in the world’ can be heard. 
 
The logic of geography also dictates that Australia, most of which lies well to the north 
of New Zealand, should have greater awareness of the ‘arc of instability’ which 
constitutes its ‘near north’. These are factors which contribute to the different security 
evaluations in the two countries and are one of the reasons why in the negotiations over 
the peace treaty the New Zealand stance is frequently described as ‘less extreme’, ‘less 
vociferous’, ‘less forceful’ than that of Australia.3 
 
If a sense of isolation can be seen as a thread running through the history of New 
Zealand’s external relations, what has changed between 1951 and 2001 is New 
Zealand’s attitude to this. In 1951 New Zealand governments wanted a ‘voice’ in 
international affairs and felt bound to participate in, and contribute to, defence 
organisations in an attempt to influence Western policy. The centres of danger were 
seen to be in Europe and, if New Zealand made a contribution there, so the argument 
went, others would reciprocate and defend New Zealand in the Pacific. Reliance on 
others was seen as involving obligations and there was a recognition that New Zealand, 
even with Australia, could not stand alone. The extended negotiations for a Japanese 
Peace Treaty forced New Zealand to recognise, reluctantly, that the United States held 
the key to peace and security in the Pacific but did not at that time alter the New 
Zealand belief that its most effective contribution in the event of war would be in 
theatres other than the Pacific. 
 
Attitudes towards Japan 
  
 
There was no difference in the policies of Australia and New Zealand towards Japan in 
the years immediately after the war, both favoured a harsh peace that would prevent 
Japan from ever again threatening the security of the Pacific. There was, however, a 
difference in the intensity of their feeling about Japan. Quite apart from the difference in 
their geographical locations in relation to Asia and the Pacific the Australian wartime 
experience had been different from that of New Zealand. Unlike Australia, New 
Zealand’s territory had never been attacked and, most significant of all, the Australians 
had been engaged in tough, bitter  fighting against the Japanese in Papua New Guinea. 
New Zealand troops remained in Europe, the Americans taking responsibility, with the 
Australians, for regional security. New Zealand’s part in the war in the Pacific was 
limited and this fact was a cause of resentment in Australia. With good reason their 
experience in the Pacific resulted in greater antagonism towards Japan in Australia than 
in New Zealand. In the case of New Zealand about 100 of New Zealand’s 9000 POWs 
had been in Japanese camps whereas Australia had had 22,000 prisoners of the 
Japanese, 8000 of whom had died.4  New Zealanders didn’t like what they saw on news 
reels and heard about Japanese POW camps but the legacy of bitterness was not as 
great in New Zealand as in Australia in both official and unofficial circles. 
 
Political leadership 
The formulation of New Zealand’s requirements for a peace treaty with Japan 
represented a considerable challenge. Prime minister, Peter Fraser, told the Dominions 
Office: 
‘It is our view that the proposed peace terms should be examined by all those 
powers who have a direct interest in each settlement including not only the great 
powers but other belligerent states including the British Dominions which have 
contributed substantially to the defeat of any of the countries concerned.’5 
 
New Zealand had no wish to be left out of the peace-making process and this statement 
appeared to suggest a determination to act independently. But Fraser’s position was 
paradoxical. He was a New Zealand nationalist and a dedicated internationalist who set 
great store by the United Nations and the Commonwealth relationship. In typical fashion 
in 1948 Fraser declared the British Commonwealth’s outstanding message to the world 
to be : 
 
  
 
‘that our countries are free and and independent and sovereign, but that we are 
interdependent, and that, without our mother country and without the strength 
that unity means among our countries our sovereignty would count for little.’ He 
went on, ‘We must still make the best of the United Nations and endeavour to 
support it in every way in the hope that reason will ultimately prevail’6 
 
Fraser was happy that the formulation of New Zealand’s requirements for the peace 
treaty and the protracted negotiations relating to it should be carried out within the 
Commonwealth structure. His thinking was western oriented, his Scottish origins, and  
wartime contacts with Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff making him at home in and 
concerned for the United Kingdom. He did not think that events that would affect peace 
and war would take place in the Pacific and in 1948 volunteered New Zealand 
assistance to the Commonwealth defence in the case of war with the USSR. He 
committed New Zealand troops to defend the Suez canal within 90 days of D Day.7 His 
concept of the Pacific encompassed the south Pacific islands which were New 
Zealand’s neighbours and some of them her responsibility. The ‘maginot line’ for New 
Zealand, Norfolk Island, New Caledonia, Fiji, Tonga and Samoa, was seen as an 
unlikely field of conflict in the existing strategic circumstances.8 
 
Fraser was defeated in 1949. The new Prime Minister, Sidney Holland, had what has 
been described as a ‘tenuous’ grasp of international affairs.9 His approach even then 
appeared old fashioned but probably reflected the views of many New Zealanders as he 
referred to ‘the dear old empire’, to ‘hoisting the flag for the British Empire and Imperial 
Preference’.10 The external affairs portfolio went to Frederick Doidge, a New Zealander 
who had worked for Lord Beaverbrook in London and had taken part in Beaverbrook’s 
campaign for Empire Free trade. Doidge proved a poor performer who, according to 
Alister McIntosh, Secretary of External Affairs, refused to concentrate on mastering any 
topic and was incapable of grasping a new idea.11 He moaned after six months in office, 
‘I just never seem to be able to get through all that comes to my desk’.12 Described as 
‘inordinately vain’, he was an Anglophile who deferred to British advice.13 While the 
essential thrust of New Zealand policy did not change with the change of government, 
the threat of the rise of communism, the ‘red tidal wave’ with which Holland and Doidge 
became increasingly concerned, meant that in the interests of New Zealand security 
they were more receptive to looking to American protection and leadership in Pacific 
and Asian affairs in spite of their ‘empire centred’ view of the world.  
  
 
 
Given the lack of political interest and leadership in external affairs from 1950 the work 
of officials in shaping New Zealand’s policy was increasingly significant. The formulation 
of New Zealand policy towards Japan was left essentially to the small band of 
professionals in the Department of External Affairs. 
 
The New Zealand/Australian relationship 
Within the Commonwealth the combined voices of New Zealand and Australia could be 
expected to carry more weight than they might singly and, generally speaking, they tried 
to act together in the effort to participate ‘fully and effectively’ in the peace settlement. 
Australia took the lead. Australian and New Zealand perspectives on the Pacific were 
different as was the style of the participants. Australia saw itself taking a leading role 
and was prepared to take a confrontational approach. Evatt had indicated in 1945 that 
he thought the position had been reached where Australia and New Zealand would take 
over from the United Kingdon the leadership of the British Commonwealth in the 
Pacific.14 Frank Corner, the officer in the Department of External Affairs in Wellington 
assigned to develop New Zealand policy towards Japan observed that the Australians 
also took it for granted that the United States would become the dominant power in the 
Pacific, that Britain’s role there could never be re-established and that Australia must 
find a means of influencing American policies in the Pacific area.15  
 
The vision of New Zealand was very different from that of Australia.The New 
Zealanders  had no sense that they should give a regional lead in the Southwest and 
South Pacific.16 Like Fraser, Alister McIntosh was an Anglophile. In June 1946 McIntosh 
wrote: 
‘The future of the Pacific in relation to British policy has undoubtedly become a 
real and urgent problem for us. Its implications are likely to prove unpalatable to 
New Zealand sentiment..I am a sentimentalist myself and the spectacle of 
Australia seeing to it that Britain recognises the force of events rouses my 
sympathy and in fact I have not yet reached the conclusion that the British need 
necessarily write themselves off so far as the Pacific is concerned the factor that 
doesn’t seem to have been given due consideration is the very real prospect that 
the Americans, owing to their faulty economy will come a God-almighty crash 
and the British may be vouchsafed another 30, 40, 50 or even 60 years as a 
Great Power..I still have sufficient faith in the tenacity of the British people’.17 
 
In retrospect his faith seems touching, if somewhat misplaced. 
  
 
 
Prime Minister Fraser was well-disposed towards Australia and was an admirer of Dr 
Evatt always seeing him, McIntosh complained, in a favourable light. McIntosh himself 
was always chary of the Australian connexion. He wrote to Sir Carl Berendsen, New 
Zealand’s ambassador in Washington, ‘It never was in our interests, and I doubt if it 
ever will be, to work in double harness with the Australians. We are much better to stick 
to our own line’.18  To Frank Corner he commented ‘the history of relations between the 
two countries is one of the two countries making an agreement, then Australia getting 
ready to double-cross New Zealand, but then New Zealand getting in first’.19  In reply to 
Frank Corner’s suggestion that, given Evatt’s ambitions, New Zealand, in order to get 
consideration for its views on the Pacific, rather than recoiling jealously from Australia 
should ‘white ant’ her, McIntosh wrote, ‘Wherever Australian and New Zealand interests 
are parallel it is absolutely essential for us to fight for our rights and whenever we do I 
am happy to say that not infrequently and because of odious comparisons we get a little 
more than is perhaps just’.20  
 
Behind this intra-Dominion prejudice one can sense here some small country jealousy 
and, more importantly, a different security evaluation. The New Zealand professionals 
were wary in their response to Australia but, given the preoccupation of the British with 
post-war problems and the maintenance of good relations with the United States, it was 
necessary to go along with the Australians who were the only game in town. 
 
Negotiations 
In the beginning Australia and New Zealand seemed to be working together, sharing 
information and producing papers which reflected a joint approach. The first test came 
in 1947 at a Commonwealth Conference held in Canberra. At that time the impression 
was that American plans for the future of Japan were softening. For New Zealand 
question was how to achieve Japanese disarmament, both military and economic, and 
with it the related issues of constitutional reform and the strengthening of democratic 
tendencies, at a price she could afford. Long-term guarantees against the resumption of 
Japanese aggression were New Zealand’s goal but it was not clear how these could be 
achieved. As it was, McIntosh reported that ‘nobody took the show seriously’ and no 
  
 
decisions were made at Canberra.21  For the time being attempts at forging a Japanese 
peace treaty lapsed. 
 
But by1948 the global balance of forces was changing. The prospects for peace 
seemed to be dimming in both Europe and Asia which suggested to Frank Corner that it 
was time to revise the direction of New Zealand’s thinking on security. His paper, written 
in July 1948, viewed New Zealand’s security in the global context of the Cold War. He 
concluded: 
 
‘It would seem, therefore, to be in our long-term interest to establish as soon as 
possible the most intimate relationship with the United States in order that she 
may develop the habit of thinking of New Zealand as a close associate and ally. 
It is not fanciful to suggest that the grand aim of New Zealand external policy and 
diplomacy might be to secure some form of American guarantee of the security 
of New Zealand.’22  
 
Though Corner enjoyed a special relationship with McIntosh with whom he had a 
copious correspondence, it was too early for this think-piece to affect New Zealand’s 
policy. Fraser continued to focus on Britain and Europe. In 1948 New Zealand 
contributed three RNZAF crews to the Western effort to lift the Soviet blockade of Berlin 
and undertook to send troops to the Middle East in the event of war in Europe. New 
Zealand was not going to fight a war in the Pacific where United States naval 
predominance made any threat there unlikely for the foreseeable future. 
 
Sid Holland, Prime Minister from 1950, said he would stick to Fraser’s commitment to 
the Middle East but by that time Cold War politics had led to a clarification of United 
States preference for a non-punitive treaty. Australia and New Zealand were still 
concerned about a possible resurgence of Japanese militarism but within the 
Commonwealth were increasingly in a minority. Reporting on the discussion on the 
Japanese Peace Treaty at the Colombo conference in  January 1950 McIntosh wrote:  
 
Australia and New Zealand said their piece which was the extreme view. The Asian 
countries made it quite clear they were all in favour of kissing and making friends and 
tossing hostages to fortune. The United Kingdom characteristically took a middle line 
and refused to show their hand. They distributed a paper which no-one read and Bevin 
didn’t stick to it in his talk either.23 
  
 
 
There was no Commonwealth view on the treaty and after this conference Spender, the 
Australian Minister for External Affairs, ‘an absolute little tick’, according to MacIntosh, 
to whom Doidge took an instant dislike, began campaigning for a Pacific Pact.24 
McIntosh feared that ‘if New Zealand was not careful her role would be similar to what it 
was in the days of Evatt.25 This suggested he thought New Zealand would have to fight 
to be heard but there was apparently no sense of urgency about this. In March 1950 
Carl Berendsen, an arch cold warrior, urged that, in the Cold War climate, New Zealand, 
so isolated in the South Pacific, should take the initiative in getting a defence pact with 
the United States. In return for New Zealand willingness to help in the North Pacific it 
could seek an American guarantee of New Zealand security.26 This elicited no 
immediate response. Months later Doidge wrote, ‘I regard an American guarantee as 
the richest prize of New Zealand diplomacy,’27 but he took no action to achieve this. The 
conclusion of the Chiefs of Staff at that time was that on military grounds there was no 
reason to approach the United States, that for New Zealand to provide significant forces 
for Pacific defence would be ‘a misdirection of effort’ because there would be no threat 
in the Pacific in a war with the USSR.28 
 
Nevertheless in the light of the American approach to the treaty by mid 1950 it was clear 
to McIntosh at least that New Zealand might have to re-think its whole attitude. He 
wrote: ‘We must try to get something and the essential point at this stage is not to show 
our hand or indicate to what extent we will modify our attitude when it comes to the final 
conference’.29  
 
In Washington Frank Corner too was concerned. He wrote: 
 
‘the United States attitude of no controls, no supervision, no sanctions makes me 
quite depressed. There is nothing for New Zealand in such a treaty. I don’t see 
we are not justified in asking for the bare minimum of limitations and controls. If 
others don’t agree (and everyone except the Australians might be against us) I 
don’t see much point in our interesting ourselves further in a treaty . I think the 
United Kingdom will cave in on the Americans to avoid spoiling their overall 
relations with the United States.’30 
 
He was instructed to emphasise at every opportunity New Zealand’s feeling of isolation 
and exposure and very real concern that an uncontrolled Japan might again threaten 
  
 
the security of the Pacific. This, it was thought, might assist in the creation of an 
atmosphere favourable to the idea of a Pacific security arrangement.31 Of course New 
Zealand hoped at this stage that such an arrangement would include Britain.  
 
The outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950 made American desire for a peace treaty 
more urgent. In September 1950 Truman announced negotiations would begin. The 
situation offered Australia and New Zealand some leverage and it soon became clear 
that Australians would not countenance a ‘soft peace’ with Japan unless they secured 
an American guarantee. In New Zealand Doidge wavered. He first told Parliament that a 
Pacific Pact was not as necessary as it had been because of what was happening in 
Korea. This, he suggested, was evidence that the United States could be relied on as a 
permanent partner in the policing of the Pacific. Ten days later he had reversed his 
stance and declared, as he departed for talks in London and Washington, that the North 
Atlantic Pact without a Pacific Pact was ‘like locking the front door and leaving the 
backdoor open’.32  
 
Australia took the lead. Percy Spender on a visit to Washington made it clear that 
Australian acceptance of ‘soft’ treaty would be dependent on a formal American 
guarantee of its security. The idea of some kind of Presidential guarantee was floated. 
This was unacceptable to Australia but New Zealand was less adamant. MacIntosh 
commented to Berendsen that he felt New Zealand would be very lucky to get a general 
guarantee of her security from the Americans. He wrote ‘I can’t help feeling that if the 
Americans can find a way - which I don’t think they can - of singling us out for a public 
embrace, let them do so’.33 In the meantime as a matter of tactics it was considered 
worthwhile to continue expressing doubts about whether it was worthwhile signing a 
treaty which didn’t go some way to meeting New Zealand’s security requirements.34 
Berendsen was concerned with these tactics. He warned it was essential to ‘play this 
game with the Americans  - we can play none without them’.35  To this McIntosh replied: 
 
 Mr Holland is all for sticking to the British through thick and thin and so is Mr Doidge. 
After all that is their traditional outlook. On the other hand they share your view that the 
US being in this to the extent that they are means an enormous amount to us and we 
should, therefore, think twice before we line up against them.36 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference in London in January 1951 was held in 
the shadow of increasingly alarming news of Chinese advances in Korea. Holland was 
dismayed by the tendency of the British and Indian delegates to criticise the United 
States against which he had no desire to ‘line up’. He went so far as to propose, without 
success, a goodwill mission to be sent by the Commonwealth to the United States.37 On 
the Japanese Peace Treaty McIntosh had problems persuading Holland to hold the line 
laid out in his brief. This made the case for security guarantees as part of the settlement 
with Japan. Holland’s presentation was a pale shadow of that put forward by the 
Australians and McIntosh feared he had jeopardised New Zealand’s position over the 
treaty. New Zealand, said Holland, did not feel so strongly on these matters ‘because it 
was further away’.38 Perhaps Holland’s luke-warm presentation was due to his desire 
not to offend the Americans or to be too obviously out of line with the British. McIntosh 
complained that Holland didn’t know or appreciate the background and his officials 
could not get sufficient time with him to talk. According to McIntosh, Frank Corner, who 
was a member of the delegation, had done his ‘noble best’ to restrain the Prime Minister  
and and McIntosh from becoming too British and less American.39 
 
Predictably when Dulles and party were due in February 1951 in Canberra the New 
Zealanders worried that the Australians would make ‘impossible demands’ and the 
Australians worried that the New Zealanders would inhibit them from putting forward 
their views as forcefully as they would like. They had reason to feel that New Zealand 
was less interested in the settlement than Australia.   
 
In Wellington the Chiefs of Staff had concluded again that on military grounds there was 
no need for a defence pact though on political grounds a non-punitive treaty might make 
some form of security treaty guarantee necessary. In London McIntosh told the 
Commonwealth Relations Office he couldn’t see much in a security guarantee because 
he couldn’t see any circumstance in which an enemy was likely to attack New Zealand 
neither could he see New Zealand accepting a treaty which didn’t include Britain. This 
reassured the British but did not reflect developments in New Zealand and Australia.40 
 
The idea of an ‘island chain’ pact in the Pacific was then being floated but had no 
appeal in Wellington which was suspicious of a regional pact which might include the 
  
 
Philippines. An informal guarantee of New Zealand security in the form of a Presidential 
announcement seemed likely to be the most attainable and to suit New Zealand’s 
interests best. From Washington, however, Holland, en route to New Zealand, cabled 
that the idea of  tripartite pact consisting of Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States had been put to him and he considered this, ‘by far the best solution’.41 The 
Cabinet, which was considering the line New Zealand would take in the talks with 
Dulles, nevertheless felt a tripartite arrangement to be ‘clearly unattainable’ and a wider 
security arrangement which did not incude Britain to be ‘disastrous’. A policy advocating 
a Presidential Declaration as the best means of ensuring New Zealand security was 
therefore approved. Such a statement by the President would be in contemporary terms 
‘the true Pacific pact’.42 
 
Though the fact was that neither New Zealand nor Australia could afford to go out on a 
limb and refuse to sign a peace treaty which the United States was determined should 
be introduced, the preliminary talks between New Zealand and Australia in Canberra 
made clear that Australia would hold to its line. Australia wanted a formal and 
permanent association with the United States. The New Zealand Cabinet instruction 
had been in favour of a Presidential guarantee and an arrangement which included 
Britain, but it was finally agreed by both delegations that a tripartite ANZUS treaty would 
indeed be ‘by far the best solution’. 
 
At the talks with Dulles Spender made it clear that Australia would be satisfied with 
nothing other than a formal guarantee and a tripartite security was finally outlined. The 
procedures for its acceptance in the United States went forward and from Washington 
Berendsen reminded the doubters in New Zealand that they were ‘extremely lucky’ to 
get the security treaty in the form proposed. 
 
On 13 July Doidge released the draft of the Japanese peace treaty and announced the 
initialling of the security treaty to the House. There was no debate and little comment 
because two days earlier the Prime Minister had announced that Parliament was to be 
dissolved and a snap election held to test the government‘s handling of the waterside 
worker’s strike which had lasted from February to July. Press comment was similarly 
muted. There was recognition that since New Zealand was not prepared to bear the 
  
 
cost of policing a ‘hard’ treaty it had little choice but to accept the terms outlined. There 
was more interest in the security treaty and press opinion was that it was not a matter of 
‘selling out to the Americans’.43 
 
Sir Carl Berendsen signed the ANZUS treaty and the Japanese peace treaty for New 
Zealand. His speeches, written on that occasion by Frank Corner and embellished with 
Berendsenian rhetoric stress New Zealand’s intention to play its part in the Pacific, to 
serve wherever democracy needed to be defended.44 
 
Conclusion 
ANZUS was the first treaty New Zealand signed with a foreign power without the United 
Kingdom and has thus been seen as a mark of independent status. But this was 
problematical. At the time Frank Corner wrote to MacIntosh:  
 
‘My mind still finds it difficult to reconcile the arrangements we are making - An 
agreement for the Pacific, but commitment in reality in an area of the M[iddle] 
E[east] where we have no representation and no intelligence of our own; its all so 
untidy and I feel we are losing control of our own fate, since we will be dependent 
on others for intelligence etc. on the Middle E[east]. I have the feeling that we 
[are] getting into a curious colonial status. But I’m sure it must make sense 
somewhere in W[ellington].’45 
 
The point has since been made by New Zealand’s leading historian on this subject that 
the act of so-called independence, the signing of the security treaty, in fact left New 
Zealand in a state of ‘dual dependence’ i.e. dependence on both the United States and 
the United Kingdom as Corner had implied. But the United States did not fit neatly into 
New Zealand’s world or into the world in which New Zealand wished to find a place. 
Attachment to the United States remained circumscribed and in the 1950s cooperation 
with Britain often played a bigger part than cooperation with the United States.46 
 
Loyalty to Britain was a central element of New Zealand’s political culture. Neither the 
politicians nor the public wanted a world in which the United States was more important 
to them than Britain but, in matters of defence, officials and politicians felt New Zealand 
needed to keep in line with Australia and both were concerned in 1951 to ‘bolt the back 
door’ in the Pacific; to secure themselves against a revival of Japanese power so that 
they could contribute to the defence of democracy and the Commonwealth elsewhere. 
  
 
In this respect it can be said that the signing of the peace treaty and the ANZUS treaty 
demonstrates of the power of interest over ideology.  
 
In the period 1944 -1951 New Zealand and Australia accepted a broad mutuality of 
interests in the Pacific but ANZUS thereafter didn’t play a central role in their 
relationship. The approaches of New Zealand and Australia were frequently divergent 
and marked by competition but, though the two countries frequently exasperate each 
other their relationship was, and is, broader than the alliance and survives its demise in 
New Zealand. 
 
New Zealand’s negotiations in relation to the Japanese peace treaty and the ANZUS 
treaty were carried out by a small group of officials with a few politicians of varying 
degrees of ability and understanding of the issues. The public was not engaged with the 
issues.Thus the basis of ANZUS was always weak. Unlike the Anglo-New Zealand 
relationship it was unbuttressed by sentiment or commerce and when put under strain - 
as in the Suez crisis or later during the Vietnam war or when new duties on New 
Zealand products were imposed - was subject to anti-Americanism in circles of both the 
right and left. In spite of American cultural inflences in New Zealand there was not, and 
is not, the same popular identification with the United States as there had been with 
Britain. 
 
In 1951 New Zealand was felt to be distant from tyranny, ‘a little out of the direct line of 
attack’, as Holland said. Neither the politicians, the professional soldiers nor the 
professional diplomats could envisage a scenario in which New Zealand would be 
attacked. Then, as now, distance and isolation were seen as sources of national 
security. This sense of being on the margins made New Zealand a rather luke-warm 
collaborator with Australia in the search for formal security guarantees against a 
possible resurgence of Japanese militarism. It led to New Zealand joining the ANZUS 
pact almost in spite of itself. Paradoxically it did not deter New Zealand in 1951 from 
wishing to make a contribution to Western/Commonwealth defence. This was seen as a 
legitimate responsibility for a country which thought globally, if somewhat idealistically, 
and wanted ‘an eye, an ear and a voice’47, in world affairs and the wider security 
framework. The negotiations over the Japanese Peace treaty and ANZUS were a kind 
  
 
                                                          
of watershed for New Zealand but if signing the treaties is regarded as an act of 
independence it was independence for which New Zealand seems scarcely to have 
been prepared. The implications of the new arrangements, their significance in the 
bipolar Cold War world, which seem so apparent in retrospect were not obvious to most 
New Zealanders in 1951. 
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